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The purpose of this research is to determine if current regulations support a 
repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process. The methodology used to analyze 
the research is the knowledge value-added theory and data extrapolated from selected 
acquisition reports. The results of our analysis demonstrate a need for an institutionalized 
rather than ad hoc rapid acquisition process. The recommendation is to cull pieces from 
the various rapid acquisition options currently available to develop a process that is 
repeatable and manageable.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research determined if current regulations support a repeatable and 
manageable rapid acquisition process within the scope of the Army.  
We reviewed a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study1 and a Senate 
investigation on acquisition reform,2 the newly revised DOD 5000.02,3 the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) 
congressional testimony,4 a collection of articles on acquisition reform, and examples of 
rapid and deliberate acquisition.  
We used the knowledge value-added (KVA) theory as our methodology to 
analyze potential value centers and data extrapolated from selected acquisition reports 
(SAR). Since its development in the early 1990s, many businesses and government 
agencies have used the KVA theory, developed by Thomas J. Housel and Valery 
Kanevsky,5 to improve processes through re-engineering.  
We used the work done by Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell6 on how to measure 
and manage knowledge as our primary methodology. We used eight value centers that 
focus on important areas to utilize in conducting rapid acquisition. To determine what 
makes rapid acquisition work, we considered the following areas that we addressed in our 
                                                 
 1 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies (GAO-15-192) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2015). 
2 Carl Levin and John McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A 
Compendium of Views by Leading Experts (Washington, DC: Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2014). 
3 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. DOD Instruction 5000.02. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 7, 2015. 
4 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, Senate (2014) (Witness Statement of HON Frank Kendall, USD AT&L).  
5 Thomas J. Housel and Valery Kanevsky, Measuring the Value Added of Management: A Knowledge 
Value Added Approach (NPS-AM-06-056) (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). 
6 Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill 
Irwin, 2001). 
 xx 
analysis: speed, agility, elevated and streamlined bureaucracy, focus, and alignment with 
acquisition strategy, life cycle costs, lessons learned, and the evolving nature of war.7 
The results of our analysis demonstrated the need for an institutionalized, rather 
than ad hoc, process. We recommended culling pieces from the various rapid acquisition 
options currently available and focusing on these value centers to develop a process that 
is repeatable and manageable. 
                                                 
7 Michael W. Middleton, “Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). 
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Historically, the United States has been unprepared for war. Consider the attack 
by the Imperial Japanese Navy on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. According to the National World War II Museum’s website, the 
Japanese Navy surprised the United States, and thousands of Americans died as a result. 
The United States declared war on Japan the following day and entered into World War 
II shortly thereafter, but the nation was unprepared to fight that war. As stated in the 
National World War II Museum’s website, “The United States faced a mammoth job in 
December 1941. Ill equipped and wounded, the nation was at war with three formidable 
adversaries. It had to prepare to fight on two distant and very different fronts, Europe and 
the Pacific. Americans needed to quickly raise, train, and outfit a vast military force.”1 
Writer Dave Marmion explains that, on June 25, 1950, the Korean War began 
when the North Korean Army sent 75,000 soldiers across the 38
th
 parallel.2 The United 
States military entered the war on South Korea’s behalf in July. A task force of 400 
infantry moved into Osan on July 5, 1950, but the weaponry required for battle was not 
available to them.3 As stated by Peter Lane in his thesis for the Command and General 
Staff College, “The rush to dispose of vast stocks of military equipment and supplies and 
rapid conversion of its productive capacity, and the failure to retain the capability to 
quickly remobilize this capacity sowed the seeds of the nations’ unpreparedness for its 
next war.”4 
Since the terrorist attack on American soil on September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
military has been engaged in war. During this time, it has prioritized getting the product 
                                                 
 1 “December 7, 1941: A Day that Will Live in Infamy,” National World War II Museum, accessed 
August 6, 2015, para. 4, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-
history/america-goes-to-war.html. 
2 Dave S. Marmion, “Korean War Outbreak: A Study in Unpreparedness,” Military History Online, 
August 22, 2010. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Peter Lane, “Steele for Bodies: Ammunition Readiness during the Korean War” (Thesis, Command 
and General Staff College, 2003), 15. 
 2 
to the soldier as quickly as possible to save soldiers’ lives with modernized equipment, 
and to ensure that the soldier has the best equipment on the battlefield.  
Because of the unpreparedness of the U.S. industrial base to support wartime 
production levels at the outset of these three wars, the U.S. military resorted to a reactive 
versus a proactive position. We created new ad hoc processes in order to satisfy our needs 
because we did not have a rapid acquisition process in place.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Now that the combat missions have ended in Afghanistan and Iraq, the urgent 
need for rapid acquisition and fielding of equipment is declining. The current fiscal 
environment requires that we assess program management and determine a better way to 
satisfy our capability gaps. In this thesis, we will ask, “Do the current regulations and 
policies facilitate our ability to conduct rapid acquisition in a repeatable and manageable 
way?”  
B. SCOPE 
The scope of this research will address the acquisition process but will not include 
research into the joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS).   
C. METHODOLOGY 
To address the research question, we will review the Army rapid acquisition 
processes and/or organizations and the regulations to determine support for rapid 
acquisition; analyze rapid acquisition successes and failures; and determine if the current 
regulations support a repeatable RA process.  
We will use the KVA theory to assess the utility of the rapid acquisition process. 
Since its development in the early 1990s, many businesses and government agencies have 
used the KVA theory, developed by Thomas J. Housel and Valery Kanevsky,5 to improve 
processes through re-engineering. 
                                                 
5 Housel and Kanevsky, Measuring the Value Added of Management: A Knowledge Value Added 
Approach.  
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We will use the work done by Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell on how to measure 
and manage knowledge6 as our primary methodology for this research. Many Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) theses utilize the theory of Housel, an NPS professor. A few 
of those theses used KVA analysis to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. 
Navy information technology (IT) systems7; determine a return on investment (ROI) on 
programs and processes in IT acquisitions8; and assess the value of the JRAC.9 We will 
use the latter as a baseline for our evaluation of the utility of the rapid acquisition 
process. We will use eight value centers focusing on important areas of conducting rapid 
acquisition. When thinking about the efficacy of rapid acquisition, we considered the 
following eight value centers, vital for a rapid acquisition process, effective in both war 
and peacetime:  
 Speed10 
 Agility 
 Elevated and streamlined bureaucracy11 
 Focus12 
 Alignment with acquisition strategy13 
 Life cycle costs14 
 Lessons learned 
 Evolving nature of war15 
                                                 
6 Housel and Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge. 
7 Cesar G. Rios, Jr., “Return on Investment Analysis of Information Warfare Systems” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). 
 8 Christine L. Komoroski et al., A Methodology for Improving the Shipyard Planning Process: Using 
KVA Analysis, Risk Simulation and Strategic Real Options (NPS-AM-06-038) (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006). 
9 Middleton, “Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell.”  
10 Ibid., 46. 
11 Ibid., 47. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
13 Ibid., 49. 
14 Ibid., 50. 
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Housel states that, “Tracking the conversion of knowledge into value while 
measuring its bottom-line impacts enables managers to increase the productivity of these 
critical assets.”16 If we determine that the current rapid acquisition process requires 
reform, the value analysis will ensure the creation of a process condensed into its most 
productive and efficient form. Since the DOD is a “not for profit” organization, the value 
analysis component of Housel and Bell’s work17 will measure the value of rapid 
acquisition and determine the value of our ROI in a non-monetary sense.  
In the book, Measuring and Managing Knowledge, written by Housel and Bell, 
they discuss the term “paradigm shift.” They state that, “A paradigm shift occurs when a 
fundamentally new understanding of a given phenomenon offers a more adequate or 
appealing explanation than the existing paradigm.”18 The idea of conducting rapid 
acquisition in a repeatable way represents a paradigm shift for the DOD. The processes 
available to conduct rapid acquisition contain only a specification of urgency for that 
requirement. We can enhance our ability to respond to an ever-evolving threat by 
removing that distinction and conducting rapid acquisition when necessary. Our analysis 
of this issue will answer our thesis question. 
D. THESIS 
To explore the Army’s rapid acquisition process with the purpose of determining 
if the current regulations support a repeatable rapid acquisition process.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter will provide an understanding of the purpose of this research project 
and the methodology used to conduct this research. 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Middleton, “Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,” 51.  
16 Housel and Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge, 91. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 29. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter will review currently available rapid acquisition processes and 
organizations to understand what the regulatory environment supports.  
A. RAPID ACQUISITION OPTIONS 
The creation of these processes and organizations came in response to the most 
horrific and deadliest terrorist attack conducted within the United States. Shortly after the 
attack on American soil on September 11, 2001, the United States initiated Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and later Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since then, the 
acquisition community used rapid acquisition processes in an ad hoc manner to satisfy 
urgent needs from the field.   
A list and description of rapid acquisition processes and organizations follows.  
1. Operational Needs Statement 
The Army regulation 71–9 states that commanders use this process to “document 
the urgent need for a nonstandard and or unprogrammed capability to correct a deficiency 
or improve a capability that enhances mission accomplishment.”19 The operational needs 
statement (ONS) is not nearly as lengthy as a JCIDS requirement. The ONS is a request 
to fulfill a need and the resources required to do so. Utilizing the ONS can bypass the 
JCIDS process because the requirements development process can take years. The user-
initiated ONS process has funding available to support needs quickly, and attempts to 
respond to an ONS within 14 days. Response time varies depending on the complexity of 
the request.20  
                                                 
19 Department of the Army, Force Development: Warfighting Capabilities Determination, Army 
Regulation 71–9, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2009, 25. 
20 Ibid., 25–26. 
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2. Directed Requirement 
The Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) regulation requires the 
G3/5/7 office to initiate a directed requirement (DR) (a process), as opposed to an ONS, 
that the user initiates. Both have similar response timelines. DRs resolve urgent needs 
that, if unaddressed, could result in serious danger to personnel or the continued success 
of the effort. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) and/or G3/5/7 approves a DR 
in writing.21  
3. Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition  
The current rapid acquisition process lacks a sustainment plan for fielded systems. 
Therefore, even if a small and easily replaceable part breaks rendering the system useless, 
it will result in the loss of the entire system. According to the Whaley and Stewart journal 
article, the capabilities development for rapid transition (CDRT) process transitions rapid 
acquisition programs into fully supported acquisition programs. The VCSA considers 
programs for transition into “one of three categories: sustain, terminate, or acquisition 









                                                 
21 Department of the Army, Force Development: Warfighting Capabilities Determination, 25–26. 
22 Eileen P. Whaley and Dana Stewart, “Path from Urgent Operational Need to Program of Record,” 
Defense Acquisition Research Journal 21, no. 2 (April 2014): 541. 
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Table 1.   CDRT Categories 
 
After Eileen P. Whaley and Dana Stewart, “Path from Urgent Operational 
Need to Program of Record,” Defense Acquisition Research Journal 21, 
no. 2 (April 2014): 542. 
4. Rapid Equipping Force 
The Rapid Equipping Force (REF), an organization, established in 2002, 
harnesses “current and emerging technologies to provide immediate solutions to the 
urgent challenges of U.S. Army forces deployed globally.”23 The REF website states that 
they support a variety of urgent requirements over a wide range of specialties, and have 
their own flexible funding line to support the fielding of rapid requirements. The REF 
timeline seeks to get the capability to the soldiers within 180 days.24 The REF generates 




 System characteristics 
 Operational concept 
                                                 




 Organizational concept 
 Procurement objective 
 Support requirements 
 Availability 
 Recommendation 
 Coordination and accomplishment25 
This document “allows REF to procure [commercial off the shelf] COTS, and 
[government off the shelf] GOTS solutions”26 that meet the capability gaps.  
5. Rapid Fielding Initiative  
The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) program began due to supply shortages 
experienced by units in Afghanistan. Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier learned 
that soldiers were buying equipment not fielded to them, and the 2008 Army Posture 
Statement website affirms that this resulted in the VCSA directing PEO Soldier to initiate 
the RFI program.27 Each fiscal year (FY), the RFI equipment list undergoes revisions, 
with items being added or removed depending upon their utility and popularity with the 
soldiers. The need for the RFI program has diminished since the war drawdown. See 
Appendix C for the 2012 RFI equipment list.  
6. Soldier Enhancement Program  
In the Army Sustainment journal, Thomas House and Raymond Strunk reveal that, 
in 1989, Congress established the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP).28 The program’s 
purpose was, “to purchase items that improve lethality, survivability, command and 
                                                 
25 Whaley and Stewart, “Path from Urgent Operational Need to Program of Record,” 529. 
 26 “Rapid Equipping Force,” U.S. Army, About Us, para. 9. 
 27 “Rapid Fielding Initiative,” Army, last modified 2008, 
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/prepare/Rapid_Fielding_Initiative.html. 
28 Thomas B. House II and Raymond E. Strunk, “Army Soldier Enhancement Program,” Army 
Sustainment 43 (January-February 2011), para. 3. 
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control, mobility, and sustainability for all soldiers.”29 The SEP timeline provides 
capabilities to the soldier in less than three years.30 The journal article adds that the SEP 
focuses on the evaluation of commercially available technologies, and procures those 
systems after successful testing.31 The SEP receives yearly funding to support the testing 
and evaluation of COTS solutions. PEO Soldier has had great success with this program. 
Many systems that started out as SEP initiatives have become enduring, sustained 
programs like “the M110 semi-automatic sniper system, the clip-on sniper night sight, 
aviation laser pointer, [and the] fuel handler’s coveralls and gloves.”32 Figure 1 
demonstrates an SEP evaluation process from Program Manager (PM) Soldier Maneuver 
Sensors (SMS). The basic process involves many stakeholders and has five steps: 
identify, assess, recommend, validate, and approve. This process takes place over a six-
month period.33 
Figure 1.  SEP Evaluation Process 
 
From Roy Trimble, e-mail message to author, June 2013.  
7. Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency 
The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA), formerly known as Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), was established in 
                                                 
29 House and Strunk, “Army Soldier Enhancement Program,” para. 3.  
30 Ibid., para. 3. 
31 Ibid., para. 4. 
32 Ibid., para. 2. 
33 Ibid., para. 13. 
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 Award Systems Contract
 Procure systems 
 Troop Support Request 
 Test Plan Development
 Draft
 Review
 Publish Final Test Plan
 Delivery of Systems to PM 
office





 Review Draft Test Report
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 Prepare SEP briefings
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February 2006.34 Their mission is to combat “the escalating use of [improvised explosive 
device] IEDs in Iraq.”35 JIDA’s official website states they seek to “focus (lead, 
advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant 
Commander’s and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat Improvised 
Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence.”36 JIDA focuses on defeating IEDs, 
attacking the network, and training the force.37 The acquisition process JIDA uses is the 
joint IED defeat capability approval and acquisition management process (JCAAMP).38 
Once a combatant commander receives a validated requirement, this process allows JIDA 
to “develop a solution and have it making a positive effect on the battlefield in as little as 
3–4 months.”39  
8. Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) (an organization), established in 
September 2004,40 ensures the seamless and rapid approval of any future combatant 
commander needs, to include joint urgent operational needs (JUON) and immediate 
warfighter needs (IWN).41 These joint IWN do not compete with ongoing rapid 
acquisition processes within each of the services. The IWN has greater urgency than the 
JUON, and resolution must occur within 120 days.42  
 
                                                 
34 “The Official website of JIDA,” accessed July 31, 2015, About JIDA, para. 1, 
https://www.jieddo.mil/index.aspx. 
 35 “Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),” Global Security, last 
modified February 4, 2012, para. 3, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jieddo.htm. 
36 “The Official website of the JIDA,” About JIDA, para. 2.  
37 Ibid., About JIDA, para. 3. 
38 “Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).” 
39 “Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),” para. 2. 
 40 Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs” Memorandum,Washington, 
DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2004.  
41 Under Secretary of Defense, Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, DC: Defense 
Science Board, 2009), 10–11. 
 42 Ibid. 
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9. Warfighter Senior Integration Group  
The DOD Directive 5000.71 established the Warfighter Senior Integration Group 
(SIG) to do the following: 
Lead and facilitate agile and rapid responses to combatant commander 
urgent operational needs (UONs), and to recognize, respond to, and 
mitigate the risk of operational surprise associated with ongoing or 
anticipated near-term contingency operations. These UONs include joint 
urgent operational needs (JUONs), and joint emergent operational needs 
(JEONs) identified by combatant command (CCMDs).43  
 According to the DOD Directive, the Warfighter SIG manages the process to 
ensure the execution of a validated requirement by identifying a valid solution, and 
rapidly executing that solution. To define “validity” the Directive states, “the solution 
must be capable of being fielded within 2 years of the validation of the urgent need, in a 
manner that resolves or substantially mitigates the underlying need.”44  
B. SUMMARY 
There are multiple processes/organizations available, but they prove ill-suited for 
use in both war and peacetime. Former staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC), Bill Greenwalt said it best when he said, “One of the truths of the last 50 years 
of acquisition practice is that whenever the military really needed something it bypasses 
the traditional acquisition process and uses a more streamlined approach. Recognizing 
this reality is the first step in building an acquisition system that works.”45 
Acknowledging this truth, we must consider establishing a repeatable and manageable 
“bypass” to the current acquisition process.  
  
                                                 
 43 Department of Defense, Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, 
DOD Directive 5000.71, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012, 1.  
44 Ibid., 2. 
 45 Bill Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got,” Breaking 
Defense, April 25, 2014, para. 1. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will take into consideration the literature available on the acquisition 
process, using that as a baseline for analysis and determination if the current regulations 
and policies facilitate rapid acquisition in a repeatable and manageable manner.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand if the current regulations and policies facilitate a repeatable 
and manageable rapid acquisition process, we will assess literature on the subject. We 
will consider a GAO study46 and a Senate investigation on acquisition reform,47 the 
newly revised DOD 5000.02,48 the USD AT&L’s congressional testimony,49 and a 
collection of articles on acquisition reform.  
B. KEY TENETS 
After reviewing this literature, a few topics continue to rise to the top of the 
discussion.  
1. Acquisition Reform Is Necessary 
As evidenced by various regulations, studies, articles, and congressional 
testimony, the DOD has demonstrated a long-standing consideration of the need for 
reform.   
                                                 
 46 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
47 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts. 
48 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 
49 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services. 
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In his testimony before the Senate, the USD AT&L suggests that the realization of 
current reform can be credited to the directive for better buying power (BBP).50 The 
GAO study emphasizes that reform requires an overhaul of the system.51 
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) chair, Representative Mac 
Thornberry, filed a bill in March 2015 that he said falls into the following “four main 
categories: people, acquisition strategy, simplified decision-making and thinning out 
regulations.”52 
An article from Inside Government Contracts reveals that Senator John McCain, 
chair of the SASC, has sustained focus on reforming the cost-plus contract structure. 
Senator McCain expressed this opinion in a debate with President Barack Obama during 
the 2008 presidential campaign, “particularly in defense spending, which is the largest 
part of our appropriations—we have to do away with cost-plus contracts. We now have 
defense systems in which the costs are completely out of control. Therefore, we need to 
have fixed-cost contracts.”53  
A report published by the Senate permanent subcommittee on investigations 
presents opinions on the DOD acquisition process from thirty experts with a broad range 
of backgrounds. Many experts focused on the following:  
 Reducing “requirements creep” 
 Incentivizing the workforce 
 Dealing with shrinking budgets  
                                                 
50 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 2. 
 51 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
 52 Megan Eckstein, “Thornberry Announces Acquisition Reform Legislation,” USNI News, March 23, 
2015, para. 5. 
 53 Scott Glabe, Jennifer Plitsch, and Kathy Brown, “Senator McCain Renews Focus on Ending Cost-
Plus Contracts,” Inside Government Contracts, January 9, 2015, para. 2. 
 15 
 Reducing regulatory burden54  
In the report, Bill Greenwalt provided his opinion. He mentions six criteria used 






6. Accountability55  
Greenwalt’s position in the Breaking Defense article strongly supports the focus 
of this thesis. “Rapid acquisition authorities that were enacted after 9/11 led to the 
creation of a number of rapid acquisition entities and processes. Many of these emulated 
the acquisition buying practices of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which has 
had its own long-standing special acquisition authority. Now that hostilities are coming to 
an end, these ad hoc organizations and processes are in danger of winding down. 
Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that these organizations and processes are not 
dismantled and become absorbed into the traditional acquisition system. As a way of 
maintaining these capabilities, current rapid acquisition authorities should be expanded to 
apply beyond wartime requirements and be targeted at supporting combatant 
commanders’ needs that can be deployed in less than two years.”56 He also makes 
another valid point by stating, “When it is necessary to go around a system to make it 
work, there probably isn’t much of that system that needs saving.”57 He echoes both the 
purpose of this thesis, and its findings and recommendations.  
                                                 
54 Carl Levin and John McCain, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Defense 
Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of Views by Leading Experts, 1–4, 20, 
70, 72. 
 55 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts, 90. 
56 Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got,” para. 11. 
57 Ibid., para. 12.  
 16 
2. Current and Future Fiscal Constraints Will Ensure Necessary Reform   
The term “sequestration” became common in 2013, when automatic spending cuts 
resulted in the requirement that approximately 800,000 government civilians take 
multiple days without pay.58 Sequestration will continue until 2021,59 and because of that 
bleak financial forecast, we need to make smart decisions on how we spend the 
taxpayers’ money. In Figure 2, we can see budgets rising to unprecedented amounts 
because of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Figure 2.  Defense Budget Accounts: Historical and PB15 (FY1962-FY2019) 
 
From USD AT&L, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 
(2014 Annual Report) (Washington, DC: USD AT&L, 2014), 2. 
In this congressional testimony, the USD AT&L discusses tackling this problem 
through the BBP initiatives that include the following quoted topics: 
                                                 
 58 Barbara Starr and Mike Mount, “Pentagon: Furloughs for Civilian Workers if Forced Cuts Go Into 
Effect,” CNN, February 21, 2013. 
59 Kevin Mahnken, “To Understand the Budget Debate, You Need to Understand the Sequester. Here’s a 
Quick Primer,” New Republic, September 29, 2013. 
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 Achieving affordable programs 
 Controlling cost throughout the acquisition life cycle 
 Incentive productivity & innovation in government and industry 
 Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy 
 Promote effective competition 
 Improving tradecraft in acquisition of services 
 Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce60 
This idea feeds into the next key tenet, Evolutionary vs. Absolute Reform.  
3. Evolutionary vs. Absolute Reform 
Opinions differ on how to reform the acquisition process. The USD AT&L 
supports a more evolutionary reform, utilizing the BBP directives.61 The DOD 5000.02 
supports evolutionary more than absolute reform.62 Greenwalt63 and the GAO64 support a 
comprehensive acquisition reform to allow for a repeatable and manageable rapid 
process.  
4. Areas of Acquisition Contributing to Delays 
The GAO study targeted areas of the deliberate acquisition process that hinder its 
efficiency and effectiveness. Reform or removal of those areas could result in a 
repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process.  
                                                 
60 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 3–12.  
61 Ibid., 2. 
62 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 5000.02, (Washington, DC, 
2015), 143–151.  
63 Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got.” 
 64 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
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a. Documentation 
The GAO study found that preparing documentation for a milestone review takes 
an average of two years.65 A consensus finds most of its statutory and regulatory 
requirements have low value.66 The acquisition strategy has more value than the 
corrosion prevention control plan, required for all acquisition programs regardless of its 
applicability.  
Both the quantity of documents and the time required to get those documents 
approved is excessive. The GAO study discusses receiving conflicting comments during 
the documentation review and approval process.67 Depending on the acquisition category 
(ACAT) level, the PEO either approves a document or continues the review/approval 
process at HQDA—in both cases with multiple levels of review. In some cases, an 
individual at the PdM or PM level provides a comment based upon his or her own 
personal writing style. The document containing the incorporated comment proceeds up 
to the PEO or HQDA level. At that level, another person may make a comment that 
contradicts the initial comment, requiring the PM to revise the document back to its 
original form. This sort of trivial issue means that a review and approval process may 
continue for weeks, months, or possibly years.   
b. Briefings 
In order to obtain a milestone decision from the MDA, the MDA requires a 
briefing from the PM. Depending on the MDA’s personal preferences; some ACAT III 
programs can have a paper milestone decision and forego the briefing.  
Since the GAO study focused mostly on ACAT I programs, there was discussion 
about the time required to brief multiple levels to obtain a milestone decision from the 
MDA.68 Experience from our team reveals that most stakeholders want a briefing on the 
                                                 
65 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 6. 
66 Ibid., 8. 
67 Ibid., 16. 
68 Ibid., 12–13. 
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decision or document in staffing, so that they can provide comments, ask questions, and 
ensure that the PM knows about any issues that may affect the decision when it arrives at 
the MDA’s office.  
At PEO Soldier, obtaining a milestone decision from the MDA (typically ACAT 
III=PEO) involves pre-briefing the PdM (LTC), PM (COL) and their staff, the PEO staff 
and finally, briefing the PEO (BG). These nonconcurrent briefs require more time 
because the PM wants to ensure the resolution of problems at each level before they 
move to the next-highest level. The GAO study echoes this experience, “Program offices 
can spend a great deal of time and effort briefing the different officials and senior leaders 
in advance of the milestone decision. Data provided by nine of the programs we surveyed 
that recently had a milestone B decision showed that programs provided an average of 55 
briefings over a period of just over a year and a half leading up to the milestone.”69  
c. Stakeholders 
The number of people involved in the review and approval process of 
documentation depends on the ACAT level of the program, but even with the lowest 
ACAT level (III), the review and approval process includes the PdM staff and LTC, the 
PM staff and COL, the PEO staff and GO.  
By definition, a stakeholder has an interest in the documentation, review, and 
approval process. Typically, the people that review the documentation work in a subject 
matter area that contributes to that document. For example, for a life cycle sustainment 
plan (LCSP) in staffing, the logistician and product support manager (PSM) at every level 
want to review it. The level of stakeholders involved relates directly to the time it takes to 
get a document approved. GAO found that even with a varied number of stakeholders 
providing their input, the reviews “added only moderate or less value to most 
documents.”70 
                                                 
 69 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 10.  
70 Ibid., 12. 
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Although the senior leaders express the desire to decrease the level of information 
provided in each document, their staff require additional information. This results in 
documents getting longer as the staffing process progresses.  
d. Streamlined Acquisition 
The GAO study points to tailoring required acquisition documentation. However, 
based upon the data GAO retrieved by surveying PMs, the tailoring process does not 
reduce the staffing time.71 Sometimes, rather than request a waiver for a document, PMs 
just write it themselves because they know that obtaining the waiver could take just as 
long. Based upon the GAO’s study of the DOD’s initial acquisition policy published in 
1971, the guidance included the following quoted topics: 
1. Minimal layers of authority above the program office;  
2. Few demands on programs for formal reporting;  
3. Minimal demands for non-recurring information and for responding to 
these requests informally; and  
4. The development of a single, key document to support program 
management and milestone decision making.72  
We can easily see how the acquisition process has ballooned into this bureaucratic 
process. From the PEO staff level perspective, every few months HQDA or DOD 
publishes a new policy memorandum. This adds to the already lengthy requirements and 
documents referenced during the development of a milestone package. The organizations 
that develop these policies can resolve this problem by looking at all the current 
requirements and reviewing them to determine their relevance in the current environment.   
Appendix D contains a more thorough review of the GAO study.  
                                                 
 71 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 20.  
 72 Ibid., 21. 
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5. Regulations and Policies Tied to Urgent Needs 
A recent update to the DOD 5000.02 includes an enclosure on the rapid fielding 
of capabilities. Although it represents a big step in the right direction for the DOD 
5000.02 to address a rapid acquisition process, the use of that process still requires an 
urgent need.73 We need to reconsider the appropriateness of rapid acquisition only to 
support an urgent need. The ability for the DOD to get things done quickly has become 
an ongoing joke because the bureaucracy seems to hinder everything we do. Rapid 
acquisition gives us a reason to reform our bureaucratic processes and become leaner in 
the meantime.  
6. Workforce Motivation Tied to Completion of Tasks versus Quality 
Decision Making 
The theme of incentivizing the acquisition workforce appears throughout the 
Senate report on acquisition reform. Progression of a program through its life cycle 
incentivizes the careers of the military personnel managing our programs. The PM’s 
career relies upon the achievement of the milestone decision.74 Christine Fox, the 
Pentagon’s former Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, states, “The 
Department is putting a lot of emphasis on pushing our PMs to change from an attitude of 
deference to private industry to a frame-of-mind more appropriate for a government 
customer accountable to the U.S. taxpayer. The challenge here is that PMs are evaluated 
on how quickly they can move their program to the next milestone before rotation to a 
new assignment. With this metric of achievement, these managers have a strong incentive 
to move the program forward, even if it should be slowed or reconsidered completely. At 
this time there are not career incentives for acquisition managers to say that their program 
is not progressing well, it is not worth the money, and should be slowed or cancelled.”75 
Because the military incentivization process focuses on promotion within a certain 
                                                 
73 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 144.  
74 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts, 1. 
75 Ibid., 51.  
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amount of time, we should discuss revising the military incentives or having a larger 
quantity of the civilian workforce as PMs.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides a variety of perspectives from 
GAO’s independent review standpoint,76 to the USD AT&L’s support of evolutionary 
reform through BBP,77 and from Bill Greenwalt’s absolute reform78 to the DOD 5000.02 
addressing rapid acquisition specifically for urgent requirements.79 The strengths of this 
literature are: 
 Independent and comprehensive reviews of the acquisition process 
 Opinions on acquisition reform from thirty experts in the DOD with years 
of experience  
 The GAO is known as “The Congressional Watchdog”80 for its ability to 
uncover inefficiency in the government 
 The DOD 5000.02 is considered the “go to” regulation for acquisition 
professionals and it is addressing rapid acquisition within the updated 
regulation 
 Varied levels of support for acquisition reform from multiple sources 
 The congressional testimony on acquisition reform signals Congress’s 
receptivity to, and interest in the subject 
 Support for extensive acquisition reform from a former staffer on the 
SASC with articles published on a major defense website 
The weaknesses of this literature are: 
                                                 
 76 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
77 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 3–12.  
78 Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got.” 
79 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 144.  
 80 John Heilemann, “Congress’s Watch Dog: The General Accounting Office,” Washington Monthly, 
November 1989. 
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 It took years to publish a revised DOD 5000.02. and despite the critical 
nature of acquisition reform, it may take years to get formalized 
 Many differing perspectives on how to realize acquisition reform may 
result in evolutionary versus absolute reform 
 As opposed to the GAO study, DOD 5000.02, and USD AT&L’s 
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IV. CASE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we will review both military and industry examples to understand 
if the current policies and regulations support a repeatable and manageable rapid 
acquisition process.  
Both the joint direct attack munition (JDAM) and mine-resistant ambush 
protected vehicle (MRAP) programs have utilized current rapid acquisition processes to 
fulfill an urgent need. The joint land attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor 
system (JLENS) program used the deliberate acquisition process.  
Data supporting the case reviews originates from both website references, articles, 
and the office of the USD AT&L Acquisition Resources and Analysis Directorate, 
specifically from the SARs.81 The SARs demonstrate the current capability, successes 
and/or shortfalls of the acquisition process, and the individual program’s latest estimates 
of cost, schedule, and performance.  
We include these in our research to demonstrate the lack of repeatability in the 
current acquisition process. These programs applied an ad hoc process to satisfy a 
requirement. For example, the success of the rapid procurement and fielding of the 
MRAP vehicle required former Defense Secretary Robert Gates to spearhead the 
program. His leadership and support ensured that the MRAP program had top priority in 
the acquisition community at the time.82 The MRAP program makes clear the key role of 
leadership sponsorship for a successful program.  
Following the military case reviews, we will discuss Apple Inc.’s acquisition 
process. The profitability of Apple Inc. depends upon quick response to customer needs. 
Therefore, understanding their process can support the development of a well-rounded 
rapid acquisition process.   
                                                 
 81 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, accessed June 12, 2015, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/. 
 82 Alex Rogers, “The MRAP: Brilliant Buy, or Billions Wasted,” Time Magazine, October 2, 2012. 
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A. JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITION  
According to the U.S. Air Force website, “the Joint Direct Attack Munition is a 
guidance tail kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, adverse 
weather smart munitions.”83 The conversion kit contains a global positioning system 
(GPS) for accurate updates and targeting data.84 Figure 3 is a picture of the JDAM. 
Figure 3.  Picture of JDAM 
 
From David Szondy, “Boeing and RAAF Triple Bomb Range with 
New JDAM-ER Kit,” GizMag, February 26, 2015. 
The U.S. Air Force website indicates that Operation Desert Storm after-action 
reports revealed that the targeting precision was not very accurate. Bombs outfitted with 
laser guidance systems performed well in good weather conditions but when the 
environment included dust, cloud, smoke or fog, accuracy considerably dropped.85  
                                                 
 83 “Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38,” U.S. Air Force, last modified June 18, 2003, para. 1, 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-
313238.aspx. 
 84 Ibid. 
 85 Ibid. 
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To overcome this performance shortfall, research and development of an “adverse 
weather precision guided munition” began in 1992. In 1997, the vendor delivered the first 
JDAMs and operational testing followed in 1998 and 1999.86  
1. Program Office Description 
According to the Global Security article, the Air Force is the lead acquisition 
service for the JDAM joint Air Force/Navy program.87 The program team consists of a 
multi-disciplinary group (government and contractor personnel), responsible for life cycle 
management of the precision strike weapons. They manage this through a well laid out 
acquisition program with technical services and logistics support as critical elements, 
ensuring continued operational safety, suitability and effectiveness (OSS&E) of the 
weapon system. 
Outfitted with the new JDAM, the bombs were loaded onto B-2 Bombers, and 
made their combat debut. The success of JDAM has revolutionized air warfare. The 
program plans on future enhancements “such as improved GPS accuracy, a precision 
seeker for terminal guidance extended range, in-flight target updating and additional 
warheads.”88 
2. Program Status 
The “guided” laser upgrade to the JDAM currently operates on United States Air 
Force F-15E and F-16 and United States Navy F/A-18 and A/V-8B platforms, as well as 
in six other countries. Boeing’s JDAM overview states that they “completed the Laser 
JDAM development and testing cycle in less than 17 months, and delivered the first 
                                                 
86 “Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38.” 
87 “Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),” Global Security, last modified July 7, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/jdam.htm. 
 88 “Joint Direct Attack Munition,” Military, accessed July 10, 2015, para. 7, 
www.military.com/equipment/joint-direct-attack-munition-jdam. 
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production Laser JDAMs to the U.S. Air Force in May 2008.”89 Boeing began full-rate 
production of laser JDAMs for the Navy in September 2012.90 
In announcement of the JDAM contract award, the Boeing Company received the 
contract for the production of the JDAM tail-kit, including firm fixed price indefinite 
delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) for lots 18–22. Boeing will complete the delivery 
order by October 2016.91  
3. Newest Program Block Improvements 
Boeing’s media room article observes that, in August 2012, Boeing completed 
initial testing and announced that the JDAM will feature a winged version, tripling the 
weapon’s glide range. The U.S. Army and the Australian Army partnered in the upgrade. 
This new version of the JDAM “features a modular add-on wing kit that will unfold in 
flight.”92  
4. Cost Summary 
According to the latest SAR summary, the JDAM “program costs increased 
$939.0 million (+13.0 %) from $7,229.8 million to $8,168.8 million, due  primarily to a 
quantity increase of 31,509 tail kits from 271,844 to 303,353 (+$899.7 million) and 
associated schedule, and estimating allocations (+$23.5 million). These increases were 
partially offset by a reduction in the estimate for procurement as a result of the quantity 
increase (-$82.2 million).”93 
                                                 
 89 “Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition,” Boeing, last modified March 2013, 
http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/defense-space/missiles/jdam/docs/laser_jdam_overview.pdf. 
90 Ibid. 
91 “Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Contract Award,” dgMarket Tenders Worldwide, published 
November 5, 2014, http://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId=11877711. 
 92 “Boeing Winged Joint Direct Attack Munition Completes 1st Round of Tests,” Boeing, published 
August 30, 2012, para. 2, http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2012-08-30-Boeing-Winged-Joint-Direct-Attack-
Munition-Completes-1st-Round-of-Tests. 




Since JDAM production started in 1998, the Boeing Company’s “facility in St. 
Charles produces more than 40 JDAM kits every day, on time, and on budget,”94 as noted 
in the Boeing media room article. JDAMs have been extensively combat-proven by the 
United States Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and numerous international allied forces. 
So far, no significant software-related issues have occurred. The program has produced 
an affordable, timely solution to the warfighter’s need.95  
The book, Cheaper, Faster, Better? Commercial Approaches to Weapons 
Acquisition, confirms that the DOD nominated JDAM as a defense acquisition pilot 
program (DAPP) in December 1994.96 As a result, the JDAM program employed the 
latest commercial practices to ensure rapid acquisition, for example, obtaining waivers 
for regulatory/statutory requirements, and utilizing contractual incentives to their fullest 
advantage. The JDAM program received 25 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 
25 defense federal acquisition regulation supplement (DFARS) waivers.97 As a DAPP, 
JDAM achieved the following benefits:  
 Cost reductions 
 Broad requirements 
 Open systems architecture 
 Contractor control of configuration and technical solutions 
 Utilization of COTS solutions98 
Cost changes to the program have mainly derived from changes requested by the 
government, such as increases in planned quantities, the application of lower escalation 
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rates, and/or reductions in associated support requirements. Other factors that affected 
program cost changes included offsetting costs by stretching out development and 
procurement schedules, and engineering changes to hardware/software.99 Additionally, 
new upgrades such as wing redesign and laser and sensor improvements will drive costs 
in the program’s future.  
Although the JDAM program completed the development and testing cycle of the 
JDAM laser-guided munition in less than 17 months,100 the success of the program relied 
on the DOD allowing the PM to deviate from the prescribed acquisition processes 
through regulatory/statutory relief, such as the granting of FAR and DFARS waivers.101  
The program succeeded in both cost and schedule areas, and rapidly delivered a 
needed capability to the field. However, the process gained these efficiencies via 
manipulation, and regulatory and statutory requirements deemed it not repeatable or 
easily manageable within those requirements.   
B. MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE 
According to the Program Executive Office for Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support (PEO CS&CSS) website, the MRAPs, “are armored vehicles with a 
blast-resistant, v-bottomed underbody designed to protect the crew from mine blasts, 
fragmentary and direct-fire weapons.”102 There are four types of MRAP pulled from the 
PEO CS&CSS website and quoted below: 
1. Category I for urban combat missions;  
2. Category II for convoy escort, troop transport, explosive ordnance 
disposal and ambulance missions;  
3. Category III for clearing mines and other explosive devices; and  
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4. The MRAP all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV), a smaller, lighter-weight 
platform.103  
The DOD designated the MRAP as a high priority program in 2007.104 Figure 4 is 
a picture of the MRAP vehicle. 
Figure 4.  Picture of MRAP Vehicle 
 
From “RG33 MRAP,” Army Technology, accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/rg33-mrap/rg33-
mrap1.html. 
The Army Project Office (APO) MRAP website contends that the original plan 
was to procure a few thousand vehicles; however, since the vehicle exhibited higher 
survivability, the fleet is now 27,000 vehicles. The Army uses MRAPs in various 
missions and are the “wheeled vehicle of choice.”105 The MRAP supports all five 
services and provides a needed capability to the soldier.106 
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1. Program Office Description 
The Program Executive Office for Combat Support and Combat Service Support 
(PEO CS&CSS) website states that they direct the Army Project Office (APO) MRAP. 
The joint service (Army/Navy) program relies on a strong partnership between 
government and industry to deliver effective capabilities to the warfighter.107  
Prime and support contractors include:  
 Navistar Defense LLC: Responsible for design and production of the 
MaxxPro MRAP vehicle line to include a number of upgrades, 
conversions, and the MaxxPro MRAP vehicle reset program.108 
 Oshkosh Corporation: Development and fielding of the underbody 
improvement kit, along with selected vehicle components, and technical 
manual development services.109 
 Oshkosh Defense LLC: MRAP all-terrain vehicle reset program110 
 ManTech Telecommunications & Information Systems Corporation: 
Contractor logistics sustainment and support services for the MRAP 
vehicle family, and route clearance equipment111  
 Science Applications International Corporation: Logistics support services 
for the MRAP Vehicle Family112 
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2. Program Status 
In May 2007, after an initial JUONS for 1,185 vehicles, Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates made MRAP the number one DOD acquisition priority.113 In the first year, the 
MRAP joint-service test and evaluation team responded by ordering 11,904 vehicles and 
fielding 1,500 vehicles.114 
From December 2008 through June 2009, the acquisition process for the M-ATV 
occurred rapidly, with the request for proposals going out in December 2008, and the 
contract award occurring only 147 days later with fielding of the first three MRVs.115 
Production and upgrades continued through 2012. On October 1, 2012, DOD leadership 
to include the Vice President hosted a ceremony “marking the end of production of the 
mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle.”116 
Throughout 2013, and until October 1, 2014, the department of the Navy headed 
up the program until the Navy joint PEO MRAP formally stood down with each service 
managing their own fleet of MRAPs going forward.117 
3. Cost Summary 
According to the December 2009 SAR report, the PM set the initial baseline at 
$22,416.0 million.118  
Program costs increased $13,876.6 million (+61.9%) from $22,415.0 
million to $36,291.6 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 7,508 
vehicles from 15,374 to 22,882 vehicles (+$7,415.1 million), and 
increases in other support costs (+$5,821.0 million) and initial spares 
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(+$1,346.6 million) associated with the quantity increase. In addition, 
costs increased due to a revised estimate for developmental and 
operational testing through FY 2016 (+$230.5 million). These increases 
were partially offset by the deletion of previously reported acquisition-
related Operations and Maintenance costs that are no longer considered 
part of the acquisition program (-$964.0 million).119  
4. Summary 
In 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates issued the acquisition directive 
challenging the MRAP program to meet a strict delivery schedule. MRAP succeeded 
because of the support from the highest levels of leadership, along with strong financial 
support from Congress. With the intent to “bypass” the acquisition bureaucracy, Gates 
established a special team to ensure success, and then funded that project appropriately 
under the blanket of “highest priority.” Many DOD acquisition programs do not achieve 
this level of support and therefore, are not as successful.  
Some of the “lessons learned” include the following quoted material from the 
publication, “Does MRAP Provide a Model for Acquisition Reform?” 
 Simple requirements. The MRAP PM ensured the requirements were 
straightforward allowing for speed and agility 
 Utilization of COTS items when available. “MRAP benefited from ready 
availability of mature vehicles that could be quickly produced and 
fielded.”120 
 Stable and Available Funding. MRAP “was able to avoid negative cost 
and schedule impacts that are common with defense programs due to 
continual, often arbitrary funding cuts and/or delays.”121 
 Leadership Support: When Defense Secretary Robert Gates issued the 
acquisition directive, he made MRAP’s status as the highest priority very 
                                                 
 119 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2009, 6. 
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clear. The PM enjoyed the highest top cover and support. Most programs 
do not enjoy this level of support from the Secretary of Defense.122 
The MRAP program succeeded primarily because it operated outside the 
established acquisition processes, and operated outside the norm of the DOD acquisition 
bureaucracy. Replicating and standardizing the program’s success into existing 
acquisition regulations and processes would require creating a stand-alone process.   
C. JOINT LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE ELEVATED 
NETTED SENSOR SYSTEM  
The Program Executive Office Missiles and Space (PEO MS) manages all Army 
missile programs, and selected Army space programs,123 as noted in their official 
website. Figure 5 is a picture of the JLENS. 
Figure 5.  Picture of JLENS 
 
From “Taking the Keys: U.S. Army Takes Control of JLENS 
Airships during Final “Test Drive” in Utah Desert,” Raytheon, last 
modified March 2, 2015, http://www.raytheon.com/news 
/feature/jlenseut.html. 
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1. Program Office Description 
According to the PEO Missiles and Space website, the cruise missile defense 
systems (CMDS) PM manages the Army’s short/medium range systems.124 The CMDS 
Project Office “is equipping the current and future force with an integrated air and missile 
defense capability. CMDS programs include joint land attack cruise missile defense 
elevated netted sensor system (JLENS), improved sentinel radar, STINGER based 
systems, and integrated fire protection capability increment 2–intercept.”125  
2. Program Status 
The Global Security website article on JLENS claims that, in January 1996, the 
Army established the JLENS joint project office.126 In June 1997, the Army released “a 
request for proposal for one JLENS sensor demonstration system.”127 In January 1998, 
the Army awarded Raytheon Company the JLENS contract.128 In March 1999, the MDA 
designated the program as an ACAT II.129  
The JLENS program provides a capability that allows surveillance from a 
distance and data that supports the soldiers’ ability to engage enemies from a safe 
range,130 recognized by the PEO Missiles and Space website. 
The Defense Industry Daily article observes that, between 2013 and 2015, 
Raytheon completed of preparation of one of the Army’s two JLENS systems for storage 
in the strategic reserve. Engineering and manufacturing development formally ended in 
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2013. The second system is part of an operational evaluation at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland, starting in the fall of 2015.131  
3. Newest Program Block Improvements 
In FY12, budget restrictions required the JLENS PM cut procurement quantities. 
This decision resulted in a “critical Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.”132 Following leadership 
direction, the PM reduced the JLENS test program.133 “USD AT&L did not authorize the 
program to complete the previously planned system development program or to proceed 
to a Milestone C or production decision.”134 The Army revised the test strategy to 
accommodate leadership’s position on the program.135 
4. Cost Summary 
According to the 2010 SAR: 
PAUC increased 17.9% and the APUC increased 13.3% to the current 
APB, because the development program was extended six months due to 
delays in testing resulting from engineering challenges. The increases in 
unit costs are also attributable to the addition of preplanned product 
improvements for reliability, safety, affordability, or producibility of the 
JLENS systems.136 
The Defense Industry Daily article contends that, in FY 2013, although the 
president’s budget eliminated 14 orbits, two orbits proceeded through engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) to completion and delivery. This allows the Army to 
keep their options open with regard to the future of the JLENS program.137 
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5. Summary 
The JLENS program, hardly a “streamlined” rapid acquisition program, serves as 
an example of the status quo in acquisition, and suffers from no real support from senior 
DOD leaders. Additionally, the program has experienced multiple acquisition program 
baseline (APB) deviations because of lack of funding, and requirements changes.   
Because of an escalation in combat operations, the program changed its priorities, 
currently focusing on equipping the current and future force with an integrated air and 
missile defense capability.138 In 2013, the budget required ending JLENS production at 
four aerostats.139  
D. APPLE INC.  
One must understand the importance of both military and industry processes in 
order to conduct a thorough review of rapid acquisition. If current regulations do not 
support conducting rapid acquisition in a repeatable and manageable way, this 
information will help structure a new process. We know the DOD has a very specific way 
of doing things, but how does industry respond to the need to develop and “field” a 
product quickly? We will examine this question in our review of the Apple Inc. process.  
1. Product Development Process 
We know few aspects of Apple’s product development processes because of their 
secretive nature. In a paper titled, Apple Rethinks Core Process: Improves Cycle Time, 
the Knowledge Roundtable Group reviews how Apple improves their development 
process, detailing their process and focusing on the differences between Apple and other 
companies.  
A cross-functional team developed the Apple new product process (ANPP) 
endeavoring,   
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To create a single, company-wide process that would inject rigor into the 
system and reduce cycle time without stifling creativity or adding needles 
bureaucracy. The goal was not a detailed, step-by-step explanation of how 
to develop new products; the aim was to produce a clear process map of 
common elements of new product development that should be completed 
across the company.140  
Apple pulled together a 20-person team, including members from all areas of the 
staff. First, they utilized industry best practices within the new process. They reviewed 
Apple’s internal processes to determine necessary improvements. They created a 
“prototype” of the process by establishing six phases.141 
1. Concept. Determine the feasibility of the project, and upper level 
management support. Provide a document to leadership describing the 
product, why Apple should move ahead, and how to accomplish the 
project. 
2. Investigation. Once upper level management supports the project, the team 
defines its product and scope. The product proposal defines the “product 
features and boundary conditions: schedule, development and product 
costs, and first year financials.”142 
3. Development. A designated PM leads the team purposed with delivering 
the final product. Other activities in this phase include “planning for 
marketing, packaging, user documentation, patent review, localization 
(how to adapt the product for international markets), forecasting, and 
product service and support.”143  
4. Validation. Test to confirm that the product meets the design 
specifications. Produce and translate user manuals for international 
markets. 
5. Production. Produce and deliver the product to the customer. Apple 
ensures the acquisition of market feedback to assure product improvement, 
if needed. The team convenes to review the process and any issues to 
discuss.  
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6. End of Production. Focus on product support strategy.144  
Test the ANPP on new product development and if problems arise, continue 
improving through lessons learned. This new process resulted in a decrease from 24 
months to a nine month cycle time.145  
2. Prototyping Process 
Prototyping serves to develop a product in both laboratory and real-world 
environments to determine its future success with consumers. Apple Inc. points to three 
helpful questions for the most difficult first steps of the prototyping process quoted 
below:  
 What needs to be real? In other words, what is the one part of the 
experience we want to create and get more feedback on? 
 What can we fake? We don’t want to re-create the wheel, so using 
screenshots for [user interface] elements we are not changing is a time 
saver. 
 Where will they use it? Determine whether users will use the product 
while walking down a busy sidewalk or maybe on their couch in front of 
the TV.146 
After development of the prototype, testers should get involved in the process, 
and answer the following quoted questions:  
 Do you know how to _____? Insert the end goal of the experience you 
have been prototyping. 
 Is it easy to _____? They may have figured it out, but you also want to 
find out if they had an experience in mind that would have made more 
sense to them. 
 How can we make this better? Testers may have answered this above, or 
they may give you some feedback on something as easy for you to change 
as unclear wording.147 
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After the involvement of testers, compare the anticipated response to what the 
tester experienced. Apple prototypers ask themselves these quoted questions: 
 What’s working? Are there parts of your goal that came through 
smoothly? 
 What’s not working? This could be everything, but you will want to give 
yourself bullets of some key issues your testers had; otherwise, you are 
back at square one. 
 What other ideas does this give us? Did the testers keep trying something 
that seemed like the obvious answer to them?148 
3. Test Labs 
Jefferson Graham acknowledges that Apple Inc. takes its commitment to 
customers seriously, with engineers spending many hours testing products before launch 
and after release. In Graham’s article, Steve Jobs said, “Apple has spent $100 million in 
creating test labs to put products into isolated chambers, away from interference, to show 
how a device and its antenna will function at every possible rotation.”149 
The test labs include both prototypes and returned models to determine the 
presence of issues at the time of return. Isolating the product in ensures that Apple can 
resolve any bugs prior to putting it into a real world scenario.150  
In early designs, testing utilizes expensive mannequin-like models. After lab 
testing, the devices go out to specially designed vans that mimic real life situations, to 
demonstrate how the prototype will fare with the consumer.151 
E. SUMMARY 
Analysis of the three military case reviews reveals the necessity of the following 
key factors to ensure a repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process:  
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 Serious deviations from the current acquisition process;152 
 A stable fiscal streamline; and 
 Heavy support from top acquisition levels153 
A number of noticeable benefits and business practices contribute to the success 
of rapid acquisition, including: 
 Cost reductions 
 Broad requirements 
 Open systems architecture 
 Contractor control of configuration and technical solutions 
 Utilization of COTS solutions154 
 Support from the highest levels of leadership  
 Strong financial support from Congress155 
 The identification and implementation of lessons learned156 
 Use of COTS systems and reutilization and repurposing of existing 
systems157  
 A stable and simple requirement158 
 The establishment of the warfighter SIG159 
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Acquisition processes currently in place support a consistent method of fielding 
needed programs to the DOD within estimated costs, schedule, and performance metrics. 
However, given the data found in the case analysis, the current Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) cannot support rapid acquisition without significant regulatory deviation 
and environmental pressures such as combat or endless funding, to justify and support 
deviating from established processes. 
If we determine that the efficacy of rapid acquisition requires an update in both 
war and peacetime, we should consider the model used in the MRAP case for potential 
incorporation into the revised acquisition guidance in order to replicate and standardize 
those programs’ successes. That will allow leadership to focus resources on rapid fielding 
of equipment, while still supporting a more stringent and managed process during non-
critical acquisition periods. 
After understanding the currently available rapid acquisition 
processes/organizations and the DOD program case reviews, an obvious trend of 
timelines for rapid acquisition presents itself. Extremely urgent requests get filled in less 
than six months, and requests that are just as important but not as urgent get filled in 
fewer than two years. This research project defines that the word “rapid” means a process 
that takes under two years. We chose this timeframe to ensure the repeatability and 
manageability of a new process. Choosing a shorter timeline would require a reduction in 
the testing to ensure the safety and efficacy of the system, and would result in a less 
repeatable process.  
After reviewing Apple’s rapid product development and “fielding” process, some 
important takeaways demonstrate the key to Apple Inc.’s success.  
 Less bureaucracy, shortened reporting structure 
 Empowerment of leaders and employees to do their jobs160 
 Focus on one or two products at a time 
 Involvement of system users in prototype development161 
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 Extensive testing162 
 Importance of sustainment or product support for life cycle 
management163 
The DOD has already incorporated some of these takeaways into the deliberate 
acquisition process including the importance of details, the involvement of the user in 
development, extensive testing, and the acknowledgement of the key role of sustainment 
in the life cycle. Less bureaucracy and focusing on one thing at a time also prove crucial 
for rapid acquisition. In addition, we must remember that extensive testing and focusing 
on every detail will negate our ability to achieve rapid acquisition. A review of Apple’s 
process reveals that the DOD and industry share important elements for achieving rapid 
acquisition. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
In the data analysis section of this chapter, we will use data from the SARs164 (see 
Appendix F) to determine program performance over time. The data will support our 
determination of the value of current rapid acquisition policy.  
In the value analysis section of this chapter, we will perform a value analysis in 
accordance with the KVA theory introduced by Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell in 
2001.165 The value analysis will help us focus on the areas of rapid acquisition that 
customer’s value and this will support our determination of how to improve the rapid 
acquisition process.   
A. DATA ANALYSIS 
One key tenet of program management says that “time is money.” When the 
schedule slips, costs rise and, if this happens consistently within DOD program 
management, the issues of speed and agility rise to the forefront, and the need for rapid 
acquisition in all areas of program management becomes more relevant.  
1. Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
An ACAT I program must report any cost breaches that exceed 15 percent 
(significant) and 25 percent (critical) with respect to its APB.166 The following graphs, 
Figures 6 through 10, display information over the last five years on critical, significant, 
other significant cost changes, and programs with no issues reported in their SARs. 
Extrapolating this data shows how many programs each year overrun their cost 
projections, and any trends associated with these breaches.  
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Figure 6.  2010 Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
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Figure 7.  2011 Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
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Figure 8.  2012 Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
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AT&L, last modified December 31, 2012, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/SST-2012-12.pdf. 
Figure 9.  2013 Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
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Figure 10.  2014 Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches 
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AT&L, last modified December 31, 2014. 
SARs data from 2010 to 2014167 shows that the quantity of Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breaches has decreased each year. We may first assume that the PM controls cost, 
schedule, and performance. However, we can attribute this decrease to a reduction in 
support requirements. This budgeting technique involves shifting a requirement to the 
following reporting period, making it appear as if the program office has saved money.  
For example, in 2014, although the quantity of critical and significant unit cost 
breaches decreased, and net cost decreased (-$9,118.9M) over all the programs, the cost 
decrease results from to a lower escalation rate (percentage of annual change in the price 
levels of goods/services occurs168), and reductions in support requirements. Increases in 
the following areas neutralize the decreases in cost:  
 Quantities planned for procurement 
 Development and procurement schedules  
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 Engineering changes to hardware/software 
 Program cost estimates 
 Other costs due to prior year impacts169 
This trend does not reflect the speed of acquisition or the effectiveness of the 
product.  
With the understanding that costs continue to rise within the deliberate acquisition 
process, and that sequestration will continue until 2021,170 we must focus on acquisition 
process reform in order to maintain some level of modernization in the coming years. The 
graphs above and SARs data tie back into the Literature Review, which discusses current 
and future fiscal constraints guaranteeing the need for acquisition reform. The next 
paragraph provides more details with respect to cost overruns. 
2. Program Performance 
To get a well-rounded picture of acquisition program performance, we assembled 










                                                 
169 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2014. 
170 Mahnken, “To Understand the Budget Debate, You Need to Understand the Sequester. Here’s a 
Quick Primer.” 
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Figure 11.  Program Cost Estimates ($M) 
 
After “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD 
AT&L, 2010–2014, accessed June 12, 2015. 
Figure 11 demonstrates the inability of the PM to project stable cost estimates. In 
2011 and 2012, program cost estimates decreased, but since then, costs have increased or 











Figure 12.  Cost Increase Due to Schedule Slip ($M) 
 
After “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD 
AT&L, 2010–2014, accessed June 12, 2015. 
Figure 12 shows no decreases in cost associated with schedule. The schedules for 
these programs continue to move to the right, resulting in cost increases.  
Figure 13.  Engineering Changes to Hardware/Software ($M) 
 
After “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD 
AT&L, 2010–2014, accessed June 12, 2015. 
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Figure 13 demonstrated how “requirements creep” affects programs because of 
continuing engineering changes to either the hardware or the software of the systems.  
This data analysis review shows the PM’s charter of management and control of 
cost, schedule, and performance. Although over the last five years, DOD acquisition 
programs have experienced fewer critical and/or significant breaches, the management of 
cost, schedule, and performance has not resulted in decreased costs. The DOD has a 
process that supports the deliberate acquisition of a system, and multiple 
processes/organizations that support the rapid acquisition of systems. However, those 
rapid acquisition processes support wartime momentum. During peacetime, without 
deployed soldiers in need of equipment, we require an agile rapid acquisition process.  
B. VALUE ANALYSIS 
This analysis will identify value-added versus non-value added parts of the 
process. It will also evaluate the utility of rapid acquisition during peacetime, without an 
urgent need. This analysis will focus on the identification of what the customer values.   
This situation involves two customers, the user and the taxpayer. The soldier will 
utilize equipment in the field, and in extremely dangerous and unpredictable conditions. 
The taxpayer’s dollar funds this effort, and the DOD should bear that in mind when 
making decisions regarding costs. 
After reviewing a thesis written by Michael W. Middleton in December 2006, on 
Assessing the Value of the JRAC, we realized that the value centers171 used in his thesis 
conformed to the areas that we should evaluate within ours.  
1. Value Center One: Speed 
When considering rapid acquisition, we must consider speed as the most 
important factor. How quickly can a soldier receive the system without compromising 
quality? Our research indicates that many rapid processes follow a timeframe of two 
                                                 
 171 Middleton, “Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,” 45–52. 
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years. That timeframe proves to be both effective and efficient and makes this area 
valuable to rapid acquisition and required for a reformed process.  
2. Value Center Two: Agility 
Agility broadly describes not just quick decision making without involving high 
levels of bureaucracy, but also agility with respect to the funding of the effort, and types 
of funding associated with the effort. In conducting rapid acquisition, agility has 
tremendous value.  
3. Value Center Three: Elevated and Streamlined Bureaucracy 
Conducting rapid acquisition in an efficient and effective manner requires keeping 
the levels of bureaucracy at a minimum. Typically, military organizations have multiple 
levels of bureaucracy and skipping a level means insubordination. In some of our NPS 
classes, we studied organizations that conduct business very quickly, including the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In a case study written and 
provided to us personally by our professor, Nicholas Dew, it is apparent that their 
organizational structure supports the ability to get new projects realized, “Internally, the 
DARPA organization is flat, with just one management layer (the office of directors, of 
which there are usually six to eight) between the director and approximately 140 
individual program managers that pursue research projects.”172 Formulating a rapid 
acquisition process requires this type of structure.  
4. Value Center Four: Focus 
In the current acquisition process, lack of focus contributes to cost, schedule, and 
performance issues. Consider, for example, the requirements process. The DOD refers to 
the term “requirements creep” when a program reflects poorly on the PM. “Requirements 
creep” means adding new requirements or capabilities to an ongoing program. A vaguely 
                                                 
172 This informally published document by Nicholas Dew, who based his research on an original 
document by Michael Thompson, Michael Hawkins, and Cindi Thomas, is not accessible to the general 
public. Titled “The ‘As’ in DARPA: Advanced or Applied,” it was written by Dew in April 2007 and 
provided to the authors in class through the Naval Postgraduate School’s Sakai collaboration website.  
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defined requirement still open to interpretation, will often create “requirements creep.” 
Nevertheless, the issue can occur even in situations with a well-defined requirement. 
Usually, the user community, always wanting the next gadget or “bigger and better” idea, 
causes the problem rather than the PM. When conducting rapid acquisition, less time 
means less chance that requirements get out of control. To avoid requirements creep, we 
should consider these approaches: 
 Understand the leadership’s vision, and the desires of the user from the 
beginning of the program  
 Always have program priorities in order 
 Define what you are supposed to deliver 
 Use a work breakdown structure (WBS) 
 Develop a detailed schedule 
 Determine a critical path 
 Be prepared for requirements creep and how to deal with it173 
If executed properly, this area will add value, so we need to ensure that any 
instituted rapid acquisition process addresses these concerns.  
5. Value Center Five: Alignment with Acquisition Strategy  
In both rapid acquisition and the deliberate acquisition process, the acquisition 
strategy represents the baseline for any program. After reviewing various rapid 
acquisition processes/organizations, one document – the acquisition strategy – has not 
lost its utility. Therefore, when considering a reformed rapid acquisition process, ensure 
continued alignment with the acquisition strategy to assure the program’s success.  
6. Value Center Six: Life Cycle Costs 
The taxpayer funds our efforts; therefore, we must ensure that life cycle costs in 
acquisition remain reasonable. Cost always remains important, but during wartime, the 
                                                 
173 Shelley Doll, “Seven Steps for Avoiding Scope Creep,” TechRepublic, March 13, 2001, 
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/seven-steps-for-avoiding-scope-creep/. 
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urgency of rapid acquisition makes speed the priority. When institutionalizing rapid 
acquisition during peacetime, speed and cost have equal importance.  
7. Value Center Seven: Lessons Learned 
Feedback allows a necessary and diverse range of input from many different 
programs using the acquisition process. For instance, we can compare PEO Soldier’s 
portfolio and PEO Ground Combat Systems’ (GCS) portfolio. PEO Soldier’s portfolio 
largely contains ACAT III programs, whereas, PEO GCS’s portfolio largely contains 
ACAT I programs. Each PEO office will have a different perspective on the acquisition 
process and lessons learned from their experience.  
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) “collects, analyzes, disseminates, 
integrates, and archives observations, insights, and lessons (OIL); tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP); and operational records to facilitate rapid adaptation initiatives and 
conduct focused knowledge sharing.”174 Quarterly update meetings held with the AAE 
require a brief on lessons learned. While this demonstrates movement in the right 
directions, the message often does not reach the lower levels where the real work 
happens. Without context from the PM who experienced it, understating the nuances of a 
lesson learned can present a challenge.  
8. Value Center Eight: Evolving Nature of War 
This area refers back to value center two in terms of the fact that we must 
maintain our agility in response to the evolving nature of war. This evolution can take 
place with the type of enemy, the location of the conflict, and the response to it (with 
Army ground troops, Air Force pilots, Navy seamen, marines, etc.). In order to achieve 
rapid acquisition, we must change with the enemy. When the next conflict begins, the 
DOD must stand prepared to fight the enemy with the best technology available on the 
market. In order to do that, we must evolve and innovate during peace, as well as 
wartime.  
                                                 
174 “Establishing a Lessons Learned Program,” Global Security, accessed August 29, 2015, para. 1, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_11-33-appd.htm.  
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Managing these eight value centers can prove detrimental or advantageous to the 
rapid acquisition process. However, if we understand how to manage these value centers 
properly, they are valuable as a baseline for an institutionalized rapid acquisition process.  
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The goal of this research was to investigate whether the current regulations and 
policies facilitate our ability to conduct rapid acquisition in a repeatable and manageable 
way. The methodology used to analyze the data was a combination of SARs data and the 
KVA theory, evaluating eight value centers. The research displayed multiple rapid 
acquisition options available when faced with an urgent need. The literature review 
exposed the need for change by citing numerous studies, articles, a Senate investigation 
and even congressional testimony. This research supported the need for more speed and 
agility in the acquisition process. The case reviews assessed military and industry rapid 
acquisition programs/processes to provide the reader with an understanding of and 
comparison to the current ad hoc military rapid acquisition process. Our analysis of SARs 
helped us to understand how both rapid and deliberate acquisition programs are 
performing, supporting our research question on whether the current regulations enable 
rapid acquisition. The analysis of the value centers determined that they are instrumental 
to a repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process. Within this chapter, we will 
discuss the conclusions because of our research. 
A. FINDINGS 
In order for the DOD to continue having a modern “cutting edge” force, capable 
of defending the homeland and deterring aggression from abroad, we need to continue the 
modernization of our forces at a rate faster than our allies and enemies worldwide. The 
current fiscal and threat environments require that we do more with less, and respond 
quickly to capability gaps in an ever-changing and unpredictable threat environment. Our 
research demonstrates that current acquisition regulations and policies do not facilitate 
conducting rapid acquisition in a repeatable and manageable manner. The current rapid 
acquisition processes focus only on urgent needs. These processes are ad hoc and do not 
support repetition. The Background, Literature Review and Case Review chapters 
support this conclusion. Table 2 breaks down the sources and findings of our research 
and analysis. 
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Table 2.   Research and Analysis Findings 
Source Findings 
GAO Study on acquisition reform175  Acquisition reform is required through 
an overhaul of the system 
 Supports a reduction in bureaucracy, 
documentation requirements and 
briefings, stakeholders 
Senate staff report on defense acquisition 
reform with panel of 30 experts176 
 Supports acquisition reform by 
incentivizing the workforce and 
reducing regulatory burdens 
USD AT&L congressional testimony177  Acquisition reform is necessary and 
achievable through BBP initiatives 
 Supports evolutionary acquisition 
reform 
 Supports reduction in bureaucracy, 
incentivizing the workforce, controlling 
life cycle costs 
Article on HASC chair announcing 
acquisition reform legislation 
 Proposed legislation that supports 
“simplified decision-making and  
 
thinning out of regulations”178 
Article on SASC chair’s focus on ending 
cost-plus contracts179 
 Supports acquisition reform by utilizing 
fixed price contracts vs. cost-plus  
                                                 
 175 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
176 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts. 
177 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services. 
178 Eckstein, “Thornberry Announces Acquisition Reform Legislation,” para. 5. 
179 Glabe, Plitsch, and Brown, “Senator McCain Renews Focus on Ending Cost-Plus Contracts.” 
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Source Findings 
Article on building fast, effective 
acquisition by Bill Greenwalt180 
 Supports rapid acquisition during both 
war and peacetime 
 Supports absolute acquisition reform 
DOD 5000.02 enclosure 13181  Supports evolutionary acquisition 
reform 
 Focused on urgent need, does not 
address a peacetime need 
SARs182  Appears that the PM saved money but in 
reality the additional support 
requirements shifted to the next FY 
 Management of cost, schedule and 
performance negatively affected by cost 
estimate instability, schedule delays and  
“requirements creep” 
Value centers  Areas that are critical to a rapid 
acquisition process that is efficient and 
effective  
 
After reviewing the Selected Acquisition Reports in both the Case Review and 
Data Analysis chapters, we see the quantity of Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches 
decreasing each year.183 This seems to reflect not only PMs paying more attention to the 
reportable requirements, but the efficacy of our processes. Without further research, we 
may infer that we “do more with less.” However, our analysis indicates that other factors 
played into lowering costs, such as lower escalation rates (percentage of annual change in 
the price levels of goods/services occurs), and reductions in support requirements. This 
budgeting technique simply shifts the requirement outside the reporting period, lowering 
                                                 
180 Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got.” 
181 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 144. 
182 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, accessed June 12, 2015. 
183 Ibid. 
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program costs, but without the requirement really going away. Our analysis leads to the 
conclusion that the reporting requirements and current regulations do not support speed 
and agility; if they did, it would lead to a reduction in program costs.  
Our analysis further indicates that the current regulations do not support a 
repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process because of the consistent need for 
PMs to “bypass” the process. The Literature and Case Review chapters uphold this 
conclusion. Referring back to the MRAP case, this program was successful because it 
was the DOD’s number one priority,184 and therefore, was able to “bypass” any 
requirements that did not support program goals.  
The GAO study highlighted the deliberate acquisition process’ deficiencies and 
supported an institutionalized rapid acquisition process. The recommendations section of 
the study stated, “As a longer-term effort, select several current or new major defense 
acquisition programs to pilot, on a broader scale, different approaches for streamlining 
the entire milestone decision process, with the results evaluated and reported for potential 
wider use.”185 The study focuses on a reduction in required documentation and briefings, 
as well as the number of stakeholders involved, in order to streamline the process. A 
panel of thirty experts from fields throughout the DOD expressed their opinions on the 
inefficiencies of the current regulatory environment in supporting a manageable rapid 
acquisition process.186 Our experience and analysis indicates that programs spend an 
inordinate amount of time preparing for a milestone decision. The preparation involves 
drafting 49 documents required to obtain approval for the next milestone phase.187 Our 
analysis illustrates that focusing on a few critical documents enables a successful 
program. Therefore, we must strive to reduce the quantity of documents required for a 
                                                 
184 Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles: Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee. 
 185 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 31.  
186 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts. 
187 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 6. 
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milestone decision, the number of stakeholders involved, and the number of briefings 
presented to achieve a milestone decision.  
Our analysis of the value centers highlights eight areas critical to rapid 
acquisition: speed, agility, elevated and streamlined bureaucracy, focus, alignment with 
acquisition strategy, life cycle costs, lessons learned, and the evolving nature of war.   
Our research and analysis concludes that current regulations do not support rapid 
acquisition, and points to the necessity of a reformed process that can meet user needs 
during both war and peacetime. Referring back to Bill Greenwalt’s quote in the 
Background chapter, “One of the truths of the last 50 years of acquisition practice is that 
whenever the military really needed something it bypasses the traditional acquisition 
process and uses a more streamlined approach. Recognizing this reality is the first step in 
building an acquisition system that works.”188 Reforming the process enables the U.S. 
military to prepare itself for emerging threats. The Case Review chapter supported this 
assertion by demonstrating the success of a rapid acquisition program when the process is 
“bypassed.” The Literature Review chapter’s discussion on sequestration clarifies the 
immediate need for reform. Understanding that budgets continue to shrink, a process that 
reduces schedules; allows for immediate decision-making and financial flexibility; 
reduces time spent on documentation, and briefings; removes stakeholders from the 
process (allowing them to focus on other efforts); and incentivizes the workforce for the 
right outcome satisfies the future needs of the acquisition community.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend institutionalization of a reformed rapid acquisition process to 
allow for ease of use. This reformed process will address reporting structure, fiscal 
flexibility, a rapid acquisition “horse blanket,” reduction in documentation requirements, 
rapid acquisition requirement development, incentivizing and empowering the workforce 
and a reduction in the economic useful life (EUL) of systems. In order to ensure a 
repeatable and manageable process, we recommend incorporation of the value centers 
                                                 
188 Greenwalt, “Build Fast, Effective Acquisition: Avoid the System We’ve Got,” para. 1. 
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and lessons learned from both DOD and industry case reviews into the baseline for a 
revised rapid acquisition process. We recommend the following areas for reform, and to 
use as a baseline for a revised rapid acquisition process. 
1. Reporting Structure 
The reporting structure for the acquisition process must be decentralized, and less 
bureaucratic. The reporting structure affects every step taken during the drive toward 
milestone approval. For example, the document review, the briefings to upper level staff 
and decision makers, and the quantity of people involved in the process will all show 
positive effects if we reduce reporting requirements.  
Figure 14 displays an example of a suggested reporting structure. It represents the 
reporting structure of the Army, but that structure dilutes with the addition of each level’s 
respective staff. Staff participation in milestone approval slows the process down. We 
recommend conducting one meeting at each level, with all staff present after reviewing 
documentation related to their area of expertise. This meeting would provide the staff an 
opportunity to voice their concerns and to have issues resolved on the spot rather than in 
back and forth comments via email.  
This recommendation emerged from the Literature Review chapter’s review of 
the GAO study. The study suggested that areas contributing to delays in the acquisition 






                                                 
189 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-Making 
Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
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Figure 14.  Rapid Acquisition Reporting Structure 
 
2. Fiscal Flexibility 
In order to support a repeatable and manageable rapid acquisition process, the 
fiscal environment must conform to that need. In our review of the MRAP program, we 
learned that successful rapid acquisition requires available and stable funding.190 The 
stability of that funding connects directly to leadership involvement and support for that 
program. Referring back to the Background chapter, where we discuss rapid acquisition 
options, the success of achieving rapid acquisition directly relates to the availability of a 
funding source when a need arises.  
3. Rapid Acquisition Horse Blanket 
We recommend displaying the revised rapid acquisition process in a timeline with 
requirements for each development phase. We currently have the “horse blanket” for the 
deliberate acquisition process, but the rapid acquisition process needs the same level of 
detail to ensure users understand the “ins and outs” of the process.   
4. Reduction in Documentation Requirements 
Currently there are 49 documents required at each milestone review.191 We 
recommend reducing the quantity of documents required to obtain a milestone decision to 
                                                 
190 Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles: Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee. 
 191 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 6.  
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allow for a more efficient process. Referring back to the GAO study discussed in the 
Literature Review chapter, PMs ranked documents from less than moderate value, to 
moderate value, to high value.192 The areas listed below fall into the high value list of 
documents, and can encompass the information needed for leadership to make a “go or 
no go” decision. These primary areas encompass a total view of critical parts of the 
acquisition process. In comparing the value of the acquisition strategy to the corrosion 
prevention control plan, we note that the acquisition strategy serves as the strategy for the 
program, and the baseline for other critical documents. The corrosion prevention control 
plan prevents and controls corrosion from affecting the availability, cost, and safety of 
the program. Both documents are required for milestones, but only one is critical.   
 Requirement documentation. We recommend a revised version of the 
JCIDS requirement (see #5 below). The JCIDS requirement not only 
details the needed capability but also its key performance characteristics.  
 Acquisition documentation. We recommend requiring the acquisition 
strategy, acquisition program baseline, test and evaluation management 
plan, systems engineering plan and life cycle sustainment plan. We 
described the acquisition strategy above. The acquisition program baseline 
is a contract between the PM and the PEO to maintain cost, schedule and 
performance. The test and evaluation management plan documents the 
structure and goals of the test plan. The systems engineering plan captures 
the systems engineering strategy. The life cycle sustainment plan 
implements the sustainment strategy.   
 Budgeting documentation. We recommend requiring the component cost 
estimate. The component cost estimate encompasses an estimate of the life 
cycle cost for the system. 
5. Rapid Acquisition Requirement Development  
Taking advantage of a revised rapid acquisition process depends upon the ability 
to develop a requirement quickly. Referring to the Background chapter and the REF 
requirement development process, we recommend utilizing a form of the REF 10-liner as 
a baseline for development of rapid acquisition requirements. 
                                                 
192 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 6. 
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 Problem and justification. The problem describes the capability gap and 
the justification describes why we need to fill this capability gap, and why 
it requires utilization of the rapid acquisition process 
 System characteristics. The system characteristics describe what the 
solution must achieve. For example, dimensions, type of power supply, 
performance characteristics, etc.  
 Operational concept. The operational concept describes how the material 
solution solves the capability gap and how to employ the system. For 
example, geographical location or employment, mounted/dismounted, 
duration of operation, etc.   
 Procurement objective. The procurement objective describes the number 
of systems required and the basis of issue 
 Support requirements. The support requirements describes how we will 
support the system through maintenance, spares, consumables, and 
sustainment193 
After documenting the requirement to avoid “requirements creep” by ensuring the 
support of leadership, we must stick to the program schedule, communicate with the user 
and document everything.  
6. Incentivizing and Empowering the Workforce 
We recommend empowering leaders to make decisions. This recommendation 
goes back to the reporting structure as well as the Apple Inc. case review in the Case 
Review chapter, which encouraged empowerment rather than bureaucracy as a way to 
achieve rapid acquisition.  
We recommend a reduction in the quantity of military PMs and an increase in the 
quantity of civilian PMs. While working in the DOD, we have all heard the statement 
“government civilians are the continuity.” With military personnel changing jobs every 
two to three years, and their careers progressing because of program milestones and not 
program viability, we need to consider that civilians have the experience to make sound 
program decisions.  
                                                 
193 Whaley and Stewart, “Path from Urgent Operational Need to Program of Record,” 529. 
 66 
We also recommend establishing incentives for the workforce to make sound 
business decisions based on program management versus achieving milestone decisions. 
Referring back to the Senate staff report on defense acquisition reform discussed 
in the Literature Review chapter, leading experts supported the assertion that we 
incentivize the wrong outcome.194 We do not want our PMs to move their programs 
along without regard for their viability. The recommendation to increase the civilian PMs 
throughout the DOD also supports this conclusion.  
7. Reduction in the Economic Useful Life of Systems 
We recommend a reduction of the EUL of systems to support rapid acquisition. 
The current EUL for some programs can range from eight years (electronics equipment) 
to fifty years (weapons).195 We can cut costs in the sustainment phases of the program 
because of less time spent there due to rapid modernization. Cost savings can then 
transfer to another rapid acquisition effort. Referring back to the Literature Review 
chapter, the USD AT&L supports the idea of cost savings using Should Cost and 
Affordability BBP initiatives.196 These initiatives allow cost savings to return to the PM 
for use on other programs. We can apply the same strategy in this situation. By 
shortening the time a system is in sustainment, we ensure that through a repeatable and 
manageable rapid acquisition process we can respond to the ever-evolving threat 
environment.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Our experience in the acquisition community led to the desire to pursue this thesis 
topic. PEO Soldier utilized the RFI process, rapid acquisition processes and the deliberate 
acquisition process. The RFI process enabled PEO Soldier to field equipment to 
                                                 
194 Levin and McCain, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of 
Views by Leading Experts. 
 195 ASA (AL&T), “Implementation of Economic Useful Life,” Memorandum, Washington, DC: ASA 
(AL&T), 2012. 
196 Reform of the Defense Acquisition System: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services. 
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deploying soldiers quickly. Deployed soldiers submitted ONS to obtain PEO Soldier 
equipment in an efficient manner. The deliberate acquisition process never fully met the 
needs of the ACAT III heavy PEO. PMs within PEO Soldier utilized the waiver process 
to shorten the preparation time for milestone decisions. However, as discussed in the 
Literature Review chapter, the process to get an approved waiver is lengthy; resulting in 
PMs writing the document and getting it approved faster than if they obtained a waiver.  
This research project reviewed current rapid acquisition options, a rapid 
acquisition program, a deliberate acquisition program, and an industry acquisition 
process. We reviewed literature from a variety of trusted sources. We analyzed data from 
SARs and the results pointed to an inability to manage cost, schedule, and performance. 
We analyzed eight value centers that contributed to our recommendations on how to 
institutionalize rapid acquisition.  
Our research and analysis determined that in order to address modernization in the 
current and future fiscal environment, with an ever-evolving threat, the acquisition 
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APPENDIX A. CURRENT ACQUISITION PROCESS 
In order to understand our goal (rapid acquisition processes), we need to 
understand our point of origin (current acquisition process).  
Every PM follows the integrated defense acquisition, technology, and logistics 
life cycle management system. An acquisition program provides a new capability in 
response to an approved requirement. A program becomes a program of record (POR) 
when it reaches a successful milestone B (MS B). On the following pages, Figure 15 
displays the entire acquisition process, and Figure 16 displays a less detailed view of the 
acquisition process. Figure 15 shows the level of detail and stakeholders involved in the 
acquisition process, and demonstrates why the process takes five to seven years from 
beginning to end.  
According to the Defense Acquisition Portal, preparing and obtaining approval 
for the materiel development decision (MDD) marks a program’s entrance into the 
acquisition process. At that time, the milestone decision authority (MDA) determines the 
acquisition phase the program enters, identifies the initial milestone, designates the lead 
service, and issues an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). In order to achieve a 
successful MDD, the PM must have an initial capabilities document (ICD), and analysis 
of alternatives (AOA) study guidance approved by the Director of the Cost Assessment & 






                                                 
197 “Defense Acquisition Portal,” Milestone Document Identification, accessed June 12, 2015, 
https://dap.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx. 
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Figure 15.  Integrated Defense Acquisition Framework 
 
 
From “Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics 
Life Cycle Management Framework,” The Official Navy website, 
accessed August 21, 2015, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/PEOC4I/ASPG/Documents/A
PSG_Manuals/files/Integrated_Def_Acq_Management_Frmwk.pdf 
Defense Acquisition Framework. 
Figure 16.  Defense Acquisition Framework 
 
From “Defense Acquisition Portal.”  
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Defense Acquisition Portal affirms that once the PM has obtained an approved 
MDD, the program can move into milestone A, B, or C depending on its technology 
readiness level (TRL). However, since we want to understand the entire acquisition 
process, we will start at the beginning with the materiel solution analysis (MSA) phase. 
In order to enter this phase of the acquisition process, the PM must have an approved 
ICD and study guidance for conducting an AOA. During this phase, the PM completes 
the AOA, the technology development strategy (TDS) moves forward and the draft of the 
capability development document (CDD) begins. When the program exits this phase, the 
MDA will select the materiel solution and approve the TDS.198 
 At this point in the acquisition process, the MDA makes the milestone A (MS A) 
decision. The MDA approves the materiel solution, the TDS, the exit criteria for the next 
phase, the MS A Certification (10 USA 2366a), and signs an ADM.199 See Table 3 for 
the statutory and regulatory documentation required for MS A.  
  
                                                 




Table 3.   MS A Statutory & Regulatory Requirements 
After “Defense Acquisition Portal,” Milestone Document 
Identification. 
Key activities during the Technology Development phase include: 
 Utilize competitive prototyping and demonstrate the technology in a 
relevant environment  
 Conduct risk reduction on all components 
 Plan for life cycle sustainment 
 Conduct technology readiness assessments (TRA) 
 Perform the system-level preliminary design review (PDR) for the current 
design200  
                                                 




 Acquisition information assurance strategy (AIAS)  
 CCA compliance  
 Chief information officer (CIO) confirmation of CCA compliance (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Consideration of technology issues 
 Component cost estimate (CCE) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Component cost position (CCP) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Economic analysis (MAIS) 
 Exit criteria 
 ICD 
 Item unique identification (IUID) implementation plan 
 Life cycle signature support plan (LCSSP) 
 Market research 
 MDA program certification (MDAP) 
 Program protection plan (PPP)  
 SEP 
 TDS 
 Test & evaluation strategy (TES)  
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The Defense Acquisition Portal emphasizes that the MS B decision requires an 
approved CDD. If the program enters the process at this phase, the PM also needs to have 
an approved ICD. The MDA approves program initiation, passage into the EMD phase, 
the AS, the APB, the low rate initial production (LRIP) quantities, the exit criteria for the 
next phase, and signs an ADM. Table 4 lists statutory and regulatory requirements.201  
                                                 
201 “Defense Acquisition Portal,” Milestone Document Identification and Integrated Defense 
Acquisition Framework. 
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Table 4.   MS B Statutory & Regulatory Requirements 
After “Defense Acquisition Portal,” Milestone Document 
Identification. 
The integrated system design begins when entering EMD, prior to pre-critical 
design review (CDR) assessment, as defined in the Defense Acquisition Portal. During 
that time, the PM defines system functionality and interfaces, completes design, conducts 
system-level PDR/CDR, and establishes the product baseline. During this phase, the PM 
conducts the developmental test (DT), operational test (OT), and live fire test and 
 ADM 
 Affordability analysis 
 APB 
 AS 
 Bandwidth requirements review (MAIS) 
 Cost analysis requirements description (CARD) 
 CCA compliance  
 Core logistics determination 
 Component cost estimate (CCE) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Component cost position (CCP) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Cybersecurity strategy (MAIS) 
 Exit criteria 
 Full funding certification memorandum 
 Frequency allocation application (DD 1494) (MAIS) 
 Independent cost estimate (ICE) 
 Independent logistics assessment (ILA) 
 Item unique identification implementation plan 
 Life cycle mission data plan 
 Life cycle sustainment plan (LCSP) 
 LRIP quantity 
 Manpower estimate 
 PESHE and NEPA/EO 12144 compliance 
 PPP 
 Replaced system sustainment plan 
 Should cost target 
 Spectrum supportability risk assessment (SSRA) (MAIS) 
 SEP 
 TRA 
 Test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) 
 Waveform assessment application (MAIS) 
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evaluation (LFT&E) to assess progress toward the CDD requirements. In order to 
transition from EMD into a MS C decision, the PM demonstrates the system in the 
intended environment, as well as the manufacturing processes. The program must also 
meet the exit criteria and MS C entrance requirements.202  
The MS C decision commits the program to production and requires an approved 
capability production document (CPD). The MDA approves the updated AS and APB, 
the LRIP quantity or the ability to go directly into full rate production (FRP), the exit 
criteria for LRIP (if necessary), and signs an ADM.203  
During the LRIP phase of MS C, the PM conducts initial operational test and 
evaluation (IOT&E), LFT&E and interoperability testing of production representative 
articles. At this point initial operational capability (IOC) may occur. Key activities during 
this phase include intensive testing, preparing the request for proposal (RFP) for FRP, 
and preparation by the PM for FRP decision review (FRPDR).204  
Approval for the FRP decision requires an operationally effective system, 
suitability and readiness for full-rate production, and submission of testing reports to 
Congress. The MDA approves FRP, the updated AS, the updated APB, exit criteria, 
evaluates post-deployment performance, and signs the ADM. During the FRP, the vendor 
produces the systems at full rate to support fielding. The PM will realize the initial 
operational capability (IOC) and full operational capability (FOC) during this phase as 




                                                 






Table 5.   MS C Statutory & Regulatory Requirements 
After “Defense Acquisition Portal,” Milestone Document Identification. 
The Operations and Support (O&S) phase begins immediately upon fielding or 
deployment. During this phase, the PM maintains operational readiness of deployed 
 ADM 
 Affordability analysis 
 APB 
 AS 
 Bandwidth requirements review (MAIS) 
 CDD 
 CPD 
 CCA compliance  
 Concept of operations/operational mode summary/mission profile 
(CONOPS/OMS/MP) 
 Core logistics determination 
 Component cost estimate (CCE) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Component cost position (CCP) (MDAP/MAIS) 
 Cost analysis requirements description (CARD) 
 Cybersecurity strategy (MAIS) 
 Exit criteria 
 Full funding certification memorandum 
 Frequency allocation application (DD 1494) (MAIS) 
 Independent cost estimate (ICE) 
 Independent logistics assessment (ILA) 
 Item unique identification implementation plan 
 Life cycle mission data plan 
 Life cycle sustainment plan (LCSP) 
 Manpower estimate 
 PESHE and NEPA/EO 12144 compliance 
 Preservation and storage of unique tooling plan 
 PPP 
 Should cost target 
 Small business innovation research (SBIR)/small business technology transfer 
(STTR) program technologies 
 Spectrum supportability risk assessment (SSRA) (MAIS) 
 SEP 
 TRA 
 Test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) 
 Waveform assessment application (MAIS) 
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systems, executes support plans, conducts upgrades to hardware and software, and 
monitors user confidence in the system.206  
Once the system reaches its EUL, it is demilitarized and disposed of, with utmost 
importance placed on environmental considerations and explosives safety.207 
  
                                                 








APPENDIX B. BETTER DEFENSE ACQUISITION: IMPROVING 
HOW WE PROCURE AND SUPPORT DEFENSE EQUIPMENT 
The United Kingdom (UK) has the fourth largest defense budget in the world, and 
like the US, has an interest in improving their procurement process.208 This review of the 
UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) study shows the similarities between the UK and U.S. 
acquisition processes, as well as the constant desire to improve upon them. The study 
discusses two major areas of reform, “the creation of a new body to replace the existing 
defense equipment and support organization, and the strengthening of the arrangements 
governing the procurement of equipment where MOD is unable to source its requirement 
through open competition.”209 Figure 17 illustrates the process that the UK MOD uses for 
procurements, similar to the United States DOD integrated defense acquisition, 
technology, and logistics life cycle management system, otherwise known as the “horse 
blanket.” The head office, defense equipment & support, information systems and 









                                                 
 208 Henry Porter, “What Budget for Defense? First Let’s Work Our Britain’s Place in the World,” The 
Guardian, February 2, 2013. 
209 Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support 
Defense Equipment (CM 8626) (London, UK: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 6.  
210 Ministry of Defense, Acquisition System Operating Model, Version 3.0, (London, UK: Ministry of 
Defense, 2015). 
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Figure 17.  Acquisition System Within Context of Defense Operating Model 
 
From Ministry of Defense, Acquisition System Operating Model, 
Version 3.0, (London, UK: Ministry of Defense, 2015), 10.  
The MOD has identified three root causes of recurring issues that relate to 
reforming the defense equipment and support (DE&S) organization: 
1. Overspending on programs. This issue goes back to requirements creep, 
when people continue to add new requirements to systems with the 
impression that the capability of the systems increases, but without 
considering the planned costs, and how much they balloon due to changes. 
The overspending on one program results in a need to cut spending on 
another program. 
2. Lack of communication between the parts of the MOD that request the 
equipment/services, and the organization that delivers them. In an effort to 
ensure that the servicemen/women have what they need to do their jobs, 
the defense department tends to approve changes for added capability, as 
requirements change late in the program’s development. Typically, these 
changes do not take into account the impact to the budget. Additionally, 
military or civilians may demonstrate the inability to maintain an 
independent position due to pressure from people higher up in their chain 
of command.  
3. Lack of processes, tools, and skills as well as management freedom to 
make decisions and follow through on those decisions. The varied and 
highly technical nature of the skills required to work within the DE&S 
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poses a problem when the civilian pay scale does not meet the same 
standards as the personnel needed to do the work.211  
According to the study by the UK MOD, they addressed the budget and worked to 
balance spending. However, all three issues continue to affect the success of programs. 
The UK MOD is considering a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) model 
where the MOD would establish a contract with a private company, acting on behalf of 
the MOD. The services that the DE&S currently provides would transition to the private 
company. In this instance, the private company works for profit, increasing the potential 
for sustained improvement. Within this model, the MOD continued its role as the 
approving authority, with the requirement that the GOCO abides by the Government 
Financial Reporting Manual (FReM). Since transitioning the scope of work from the 
DE&S to the private company would represent a significant undertaking, the plan to 
transition would occur over a nine-year timeframe/contract.212 Figure 18 shows how the 
transition would take place. 
Figure 18.  Implementation of GOCO Operating Model 
 
From Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving 
How We Procure and Support Defense Equipment, 18. 
                                                 
211 Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support 
Defense Equipment, 12–14. 
212 Ibid., 17–20. 
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The MOD has also focused on reforming single-source procurement. The 
feasibility of the militarization of commercial items, in those circumstances, makes it 
easy to find multiple suppliers. However, in some specialties, only one supplier can 
produce a combat ready product. The MOD study declares that they spend six billion 
British pounds (approximately $9.3 billion) every year on single-source procurements. 
With a lack of competition, vendors can price their equipment based upon how much 
profit they desire or require, and the government ends up overpaying as a result. The 
vendors also know that the military needs the equipment, and that despite high prices and 
low performance, the military will continue to procure from that single vendor because 
they have no other options.213  
According to the study, the MOD, in consultation with industry, has developed a 
new framework for single source procurement. The MOD will allow industry a fair profit 
in exchange greater transparency, allowing them to examine the suppliers’ processes for 
efficiency. A standardized report provided to the MOD will allow them to identify areas 
for cost reduction. The MOD will hold the supplier accountable for their cost projections 
to ensure the MOD receives fair and reasonable pricing. Instituting this new framework 
on a statutory basis, rather than by contract, will establish this requirement consistently 
throughout single-source supply chains. The establishment of a single-source regulations 
office (SSRO) will ensure compliance, monitor application of and conformity with 
regulations, and provide conclusive determinations if a dispute between the MOD and a 
single source supplier arise.214  
The reformation of single-source procurement should address better price 
negotiation and stronger efficiency incentives. Due to the lack of competition to drive 
down prices, the MOD and the new framework must have the ability to ensure 
competitive prices without the competition. Utilization of a reference framework that 
describes how to calculate prices ensures aggressive pricing. A framework in place that 
                                                 
213 Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support 
Defense Equipment, 23. 
214 Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support 
Defense Equipment, 24.  
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enables and requires the vendors to seek improvement and efficiencies could address 
stronger efficiency incentives, just as with price negotiation. The MOD determined that 
profit should reward efficiencies. In some circumstances, the prime contractor has 
subcontractors and for each level of contractor, profit adds to the price, leading to a 
“profit on profit” situation. Currently, the complexity of allocating overhead and the 
process involved with doing so results in high potential for over-recovery or under-
recovery. A report provided to the MOD from the contractor will detail the overhead 
recovered with the overhead spent to ensure the costs are justifiable. Currently the UK 
MOD has the responsibility to determine the validity, efficiency, or extravagance of 
costs. The UK MOD as an organization does not actually incur the costs, further 
complicating the situation. Under the new framework, this obligation will fall to the 
contractor.215 Table 6 summarizes the suggested changes with respect to single-source 
procurement. 
Table 6.   Summary of New Single-Source Contract Regulations 
Area Element Purpose 
Transparency Open book To provide a general back-stop to help assume value for 
money in single-source procurement and to check that 
the new framework works 
Audit rights and referral 
rights to an independent 
expert 
To put a duty on suppliers to use reasonable and 
appropriate pricing assumptions 
Pricing Standard profit To provide industry with an independently assessed fair 
return, equal to the average of UK industry 
Incentivizing 
efficiency 
To allow additional profit when earned by performance 
Variation of Profit with risk To allow additional profit where it is earned by 
                                                 
215 Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support 
Defense Equipment, 24. 
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(+/- 2.5 percent) performance 
Protection from excessive 
profits and losses 
To provide the MOD with protection in the event of 
excessive supplier profit, and suppliers protection 
against excessive losses 
No profit on profit To ensure suppliers get a fair profit, and not an 
unwarranted profit achieved simply by clever deal 
structuring 
Standard list of allowable 
costs 
To ensure both parties negotiate fair prices within a 
clear and coherent approach and on a level playing field 
Onus of proof To put a duty on suppliers to demonstrate the overhead 
costs they claim are reasonable and appropriate for 




Benchmark reports at 
start/end/amendments 
To improve price negotiation (and capability planning) 
by building up a database of defense benchmarks from 
comparable projects 
Quarterly contract reports To get timely checks on project health that can be used 
to support a stronger financial and performance 
management regime; and so that the MOD can negotiate 
follow-on prices with a good understanding of historic 
costs 
Annual contract reports To maintain an audit trail of the cost baseline 





Annual overhead benchmark 
reports 
To improve overhead negotiation by building up a 
database of overhead benchmarks 
Overhead comparison report To check the effectiveness of the range of overhead 
recovery methods we have available 
Long term overhead report To optimize the industrial capacity we pay for with our 
long-term military requirements 
SME report To support SMEs down the supply chain 
Compliance 
Regime 
Publically naming the 
supplier 
To increase the timeliness and likelihood of adherence 
to the new regulations 
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Financial penalty 
From Ministry of Defense, Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How 
We Procure and Support Defense Equipment, 32–33. 
The MOD experienced other issues related to budget deficits, “absence of clear 
understanding of requirements, and cost drivers; poor cost projections; and inadequate 
project management.”216 Currently the MOD plans to do business with 28 percent fewer 
people, a reduction required by the 2010 Strategic Defense Security Review (SDSR).217 
By reviewing the procurement issues taking place with the UK MOD, we attempt 
to understand what kind of problems one of our closest allies has within military defense 
and procurement. This will help us understand the differences and similarities we both 
experience within our defense departments. However, we must keep in mind that the UK 
defense budget represents only 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget. In comparing the 
defense budget as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the United States 
spends 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense and the UK spends 2.1 percent of its GDP on 









                                                 
216 Better Defense Acquisition: Improving How We Procure and Support Defense Equipment, 9. 
217 Ibid., 9. 
218 “Military Spending Data,” The World Bank, accessed June 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS. 
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Figure 19.  Military Spending Top Ten Countries ($B) 
 
After “Military Spending Data,” The World Bank, accessed June 
16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.  
Figure 20.  Military Spending by Percentage of GDP 
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APPENDIX C. FY 2012 RFI EQUIPMENT LIST 
 
From “PEO Soldier website,” FY12 Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) 
Equipment List, accessed June 16, 2015, 
http://www.peosoldier.army.mil/docs/fy12-rfi-list-1aug11.pdf. 
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APPENDIX D. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 
STUDY ON ACQUISITION REFORM: DOD SHOULD 
STREAMLINE ITS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR WEAPON 
SYSTEMS TO REDUCE INEFFICIENCIES 
After reviewing this GAO study, we found that the documentation process, the 
briefing of the program to obtain milestone approval, and even lower-level briefings 
required by staff, inundate the PM with requirements that do not support the management 
of the program.219 Future budget constraints require the DOD to determine how to 
proceed with a more streamlined acquisition process. The GAO study stated it best, “It is 
not the need or value of an acquisition strategy or a technology readiness assessment that 
is at question. Rather, when analysis reveals the significant amount of process that has 
evolved around essential activities like acquisition strategies and technology readiness 
assessments, the question becomes whether the additional process and review is 
achieving the desired program results in terms of better cost and schedule outcomes.”220 
1. Documentation 
The GAO “surveyed 24 program managers that held a MS B or C decision since 
2010”221 and determined that it took them “on average over two years completing the 
steps necessary to document up to forty-nine information requirements for their most 
recent acquisition milestone.”222 The GAO determined that from the list of statutory and 
regulatory requirements, some documents took from six to 24 months to complete.223 
This timeline includes not only the time spent drafting the document, but the time spent 
in the review and approval process. The PMs surveyed also ranked the documentation 
that they considered high value, moderate value, and less than moderate value. Breaking 
                                                 
 219 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies. 
220 Ibid., 15. 
221 Ibid., 7.  
222 Ibid., 6.  
223 Ibid., 10. 
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down the 49 information requirements by value, PMs ranked 24 requirements as high 
value, 20 as moderate value, and five as less than moderate value.224 Determination of 
high value documents comes easily; they include the AS, test and evaluation master plan 
(TEMP), life cycle sustainment plan (LCSP), cost estimate, etc. Low-value documents 
consisted of the corrosion prevention control plan, Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) 
Compliance, IUID Implementation Plan, etc. We have experience receiving conflicting 
comments during the documentation review and approval process, an issue mentioned in 
the GAO study.225 Depending on the ACAT Level, the PEO approves the document, or it 
continues the review/approval process at HQDA. Either way, it undergoes multiple levels 
of review. Then, at the PdM or PM level, someone provides a comment based upon his or 
her own personal writing style. The document, including the incorporated comment, 
proceeds up to the PEO or HQDA level. At that level, another person may make a 
contradictory comment, requiring the PM to revise the document back to its original 
form. This kind of trivial issue ensures that the review and approval process continues for 
months, and possibly years. The GAO study supports this issue by stating, “Several 
program officials told us they spend extensive time and resources addressing conflicting 
comments/concerns expressed by functional offices at the different levels during the 







                                                 
 224 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 8. 
225 Ibid., 16. 
226 Ibid., 16. 
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Figure 21.  Milestone Levels of Review 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: 
DOD Should Streamline its Decision-Making Process for Weapon 
Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 13. 
2. Briefings 
In order to obtain a milestone decision from the MDA, the MDA requires a 
briefing from the PM. Depending on the MDA’s personal preferences; some ACAT III 
programs can have a paper milestone decision and forego the briefing.  
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Since the GAO study focused mostly on ACAT I programs, we discussed the time 
it takes to brief multiple levels in order to finally obtain a milestone decision from the 
MDA.227 Experiences from our team reveals that most stakeholders want a briefing on 
the decision or document being staffed so that they have the opportunity to provide their 
comments, ask questions, and ensure that the PM knows of any issues that may affect the 
decision when it arrives at the MDA’s office. At PEO Soldier, obtaining a milestone 
decision from the MDA (typically ACAT III=PEO) involves pre-briefing the PdM 
(LTC), PM (COL) and his staff, the PEO staff, and ultimately briefing the PEO (BG). 
These briefs usually do not happen concurrently, because the PM wants to ensure that 
they resolve any issues discovered at each level before they reach the next higher level. 
The GAO study echoes this experience, “Program offices can spend a great deal of time 
and effort briefing the different officials and senior leaders in advance of the milestone 
decision. Data provided by nine of the programs we surveyed that recently had a 
milestone B decision showed that programs provided an average of 55 briefings over a 
period of just over a year and a half leading up to the milestone.”228  
3. Stakeholders 
The number of people involved in the review and approval process of 
documentation depends on the ACAT level of the program, but even with the lowest 
ACAT level (III), the review and approval process would include the PdM staff and LTC, 
the PM staff and COL, the PEO staff and GO. By definition, a stakeholder has an interest 
in the documentation, review, and approval process. Typically, the people that review the 
documentation work in the subject matter area that contributes to that document in some 
way. For example, a life cycle sustainment plan’s (LCSP) development, review, and 
approval should require the involvement of the logistician and PSM at every level. The 
level of stakeholders involved relates directly to the time it takes to get a document 
approved. GAO found that even with a varied amount of stakeholders providing their 
                                                 
 227 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 12–13. 
228 Ibid., 10. 
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input, the reviews “added only moderate or less value to most documents.”229 GAO 
found nine levels of review for an ACAT I program. Those nine levels contain 56 offices, 
but considering that they grouped the program office into one level of review, one could 
argue that it actually represents two levels of review.230 PEO Soldier has four 06 level 
PMs, and eight 05 level PdMs below them. This may not be typical for a PEO office with 
only ACAT I programs, but PEO Soldier has a majority of ACAT III programs. The 
GAO made note of the fact that some more specialized documents make it through 
staffing more quickly because fewer stakeholders review and approve those documents. 
For example, the subject matter expert (SME) in that area may only review the TRA. The 
involvement of so many stakeholders in the staffing process can mean that although the 
senior leaders express the desire to decrease the level of information provided in each 
document, their staff might require additional information. This results in documents 
getting longer as the staffing process progresses.  
4. Streamlined Acquisition 
The GAO study discusses the existing process to tailor required acquisition 
documentation. However, based upon the data GAO retrieved by surveying PMs, the 
tailoring process does not reduce the staffing time. Sometimes, rather than request a 
waiver for a document, PMs just write it because they know that obtaining the waiver 
could take just as long. Based upon the GAO’s study of the DOD’s initial acquisition 
policy published in 1971, the guidance included the following quoted topics: 
1. Minimal layers of authority above the program office;  
2. Few demands on programs for formal reporting;  
3. Minimal demands for non-recurring information and for responding to 
these requests informally; and  
                                                 
229 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 12. 
 230 Ibid., 14. 
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4. The development of a single, key document to support program 
management and milestone decision making. Over time, a large, 
bureaucratic process has supplanted these elements.231  
From experience, we can see how the acquisition process ballooned into this 
bureaucratic process. From the PEO staff level perspective, every few months HQDA or 
DOD publishes a new policy memorandum. This adds to the already lengthy 
requirements and documents referenced during the development of a milestone package. 
The organizations developing these policies can resolve this problem by looking at all the 
current requirements and reviewing them to determine their relevance. Figure 22 shows a 
streamlined version of the review process. 
Figure 22.  Streamlined Levels of Review (Classified Programs) 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: 
DOD Should Streamline its Decision-Making Process for Weapon 
                                                 
231 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 21. 
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Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 24. 
We can also streamline processes by mirroring the acquisition process followed 
by commercial companies. The GAO study found that senior staff develop and approve a 
few key programmatic documents, but functional managers in charge of the program 
office prepare other programmatic documents.232 In order to enable this approach, we 
must ensure regular interactions between the people that develop the documentation and 
the people that are approving the documentation and those who approve it. This allows 
the decision makers to remain aware of the program’s progress toward the milestone, so 
when the time comes to get approval for the milestone, the decision maker just needs to 
make the decision. Figure 23 illustrates this approach, making it clear that a flat 
organizational structure supports this process.  
Figure 23.  Interactions Between Functional Staff and Decision Makers 
 
From Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: 
DOD Should Streamline its Decision-Making Process for Weapon 
Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 27. 
                                                 
 232 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 31. 
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One of the companies evaluated in the GAO study changed its working 
environment from offices to an open area where everyone can interact with each other.233 
We must question the ability to implement the commercial model within the government 
however, because in the commercial environment, the company will prosper and profit by 
completing quality milestone decisions with efficiency (time is money), thereby 
incentivizing an improved process. The government, however, does not have that same 
incentive. The bureaucracy within the government began by attempting to ensure that we 
spend the taxpayers’ dollars wisely, but the levels of review have the opposite effect. The 
GAO study reflects this statement, “Commercial product development cycle times are 
relatively short (less than five years), making it easier to minimize management turnover 
and to maintain accountability. DOD’s acquisitions occur in a different environment 
where cycle times are long (10 to 15 years), management turnover is frequent, 
accountability is elusive, and cost and schedules are not constrained by market forces. 
Seen in this light, DOD must have an oversight process that substitutes discipline for 
commercial market incentives. Several industry officials stated that companies often add 
oversight levels or reviews as a first reaction after failures or problems occur. However, 
the officials further stated that this does not solve the root problems and often makes the 
process less efficient.”234  
  
                                                 
 233 Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies, 27. 
234 Ibid., 28. 
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APPENDIX E. DOD INSTRUCTION 5000.02: ENCLOSURE 13. 
RAPID FIELDING OF CAPABILITIES 
The DOD published a revised version of its 5000.02 on 7 January 2015, with an 
added enclosure that addresses the “Rapid Fielding of Capabilities.” This enclosure 
addresses a growing concern about the slowness of the current acquisition process and its 
inability to accommodate the agility and efficiency required to get state of the art 
equipment to soldiers in a reasonable timeframe. This enclosure addresses “programs that 
provide capabilities to fulfill urgent operational needs and other quick reaction 
capabilities that can be fielded in less than 2 years and are below the cost thresholds of 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and IA programs.”235 The enclosure applies to UON; a 
warfighter SIG identified urgent issue, and a secretary of defense rapid acquisition 












                                                 
235 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 143. 
236 Ibid., 143–144. 
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Table 7.   Rapid Acquisition Program Types 
 
After Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 143–144. 
In order for the acquisition community to use this enclosure efficiently and 
effectively, we must understand certain procedures and assumptions: 
 PM’s should utilize tailoring and streamlining, and receive support 
through and up to the approval authority (MDA) 
 Utilize sequential processes to the greatest extent possible 
 Encourage “paper” milestones rather than a formal milestone briefing 
 Abbreviate the development part of the acquisition process, and approve 
production at the same time as development 
 Ensure that support organizations (financial, contracting, etc.) understand 
the rapid nature of the program and can ensure accelerated action 
 Fluid funding availability to rapid acquisition programs. We cannot use 
reprogramming restrictions required for typical programs in this case 
Joint Urgent/Emergent 
Operational Needs  




Chairman Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS), or Vice 
Chairman Joint Chiefs 




• Emergent need 
identified by a 
Combatant 
Commander, CJCS, 
VCJCS, for an 
anticipated or pending 
contingency operation 
•Approval by the Joint 
Staff in accordance 






• Approval authorities, 
including their 
validation, program 
execution, and the 
designation of MDA, 
will be at the DoD 
Component level 
Warfighter SIG 
Identified Urgent Issue 
• Critical warfighter 
issue identified by the 
Co-Chairs of the SIG 
• Co-Chairs approve 
critical warfighter 
statement and provide 




Secretary of Defense 
RAA Determination 
• Secretary of Defense 
signed determination 
of deficiency 
• RAA only considered 
when, within certain 
limitations, a waiver of 
a law, policy, directive, 
or regulation will 
greatly accelerate the 
delivery of effective 
capability to the 
warfighter 
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 If PM cannot field capability within 2 years, give consideration to 
satisfying the requirement with an immediate partial solution immediately 
while working on the full solution237 
This enclosure outlines the activities that would take place during the two-year 
process of getting the capability to the warfighter. The activities break out into pre-
development, development, production and deployment (P&D), and O&S.238  
We must understand, as stated in the DOD 5000.02:  
The activities detailed in this enclosure are not separate from or in addition 
to activities performed as part of the acquisition system but are a highly 
tailored version of those activities and are intended to expedite the fielding 
of capability by tailoring the documentation and reviews normally 
required as part of the deliberate acquisition process.239 
The pre-development phase determines a course of action and develops an 
approach to the acquisition effort, as described in the DOD Instruction. During this part 
of the process, CAE receives the UON or RAA, and designates a PM and MDA for this 
effort. The PM must complete several activities during this phase: evaluating the 
capability and considering non-material options; analyzing courses of action; considering 
existing domestic/foreign capability; assessing acquisition and operational risk of 
potential solutions; briefing the MDA to obtain a decision, and drafting an ADM 
documenting that decision. As a part of this tailorable process, the PM will develop an 
abbreviated AS and APB to use as the baseline strategy for program decisions and 
activities.240  
According to the DOD Instruction, in the development milestone, the MDA will 
review the program documentation to determine the feasibility of developing and fielding 
the system within two years, that the system utilizes technology on the market and 
proven, and assure procurement of the system under a fixed-price contract. At this point, 
the MDA will approve initial production quantities, the AS and the APB, and conduct an 
                                                 
237 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 144. 
238 Ibid., 145. 
239 Ibid., 145. 
240 Ibid., 145–147. 
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RAA determination to decide if the systems will require accelerated fielding. 
Development of the testing plan begins in this phase, and does not require a complete 
TEMP due to the rapid nature of the program and the limited amount of development 
effort required. The MDA will approve waivers to regulations and statutes and can 
authorize the release of the RFP. During the Development phase, the PM evaluates the 
system against standards for performance, safety, suitability, and survivability. However, 
if areas in the system do not meet the requirement, movement into the following 
milestone can continue regardless. The user and the MDA will determine areas that 
require addressing prior to the production and deployment milestone.241  
In the P&D milestone, the DOD Instruction adds that the PM will present the 
results of the development milestone and provide plans to the MDA regarding 
sustainment of the system. The MDA determines the sufficiency of the system evaluation 
and if production will begin. The AS and APB receive updates during this phase as well. 
After the completion of production and fielding of the systems to the warfighter, the 
system will enter O&S.242   
In the O&S milestone, as noted in the DOD Instruction, using the sustainment 
plan developed and approved in the P&D phase, the support of the system begins. At this 
point, since the warfighter has had the system for some time, the PM may propose an 
improvement that requires immediate action. The test organization in the field will 
initiate a post-deployment assessment, if possible. If not, feedback from the Operational 
Test Agency (OTA) may suffice. No later than one year after the system enters O&S, an 
independent official will conduct the disposition analysis.243 The person appointed by the 
DOD component to determine disposition recommends one of the three quoted options:  
1. Termination: Demilitarization or Disposal 
2. Sustainment for Current Contingency 
                                                 
241 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 147–149. 
242 Ibid., 149–150. 
243 Ibid., 150–151. 
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3. Transition to Program of Record244 
Higher headquarters reviews and records the disposition recommendation in a 
disposition determination. Table 8 provides details on the requirements specific to the 
rapid acquisition process.  
Table 8.   Information Requirements Unique to the Urgent Needs Rapid Acquisition 
Process 
Information Requirement 





● ● 10 USC 2366 Ref g  
10 USC 2399 Ref g 
Only required for urgent need programs.  
Course of Action Analysis 
● 
  
Subtitle III, Title 40, USC Ref 
p 
Replaces and serves as the AOA.  
Approved by the MDA. 
Used for JUONs, JEONs, critical warfighter issues, and RAA determinations.  
Rapid Acquisition Authority 
(RAA) Recommendation 
● 
  Sec 806 PL 107–314 Ref i 
Part of the Acquisition Strategy. 
MDA approves request for RAA at Development milestone. 
Regulatory Requirement 
Disposition Authority’s Report 
to the DOD Component Head     
Para 4e(5) of DOD 5000.02, 
Enclosure 13  
Due within one year of entering O&S phase. 
Disposition official provides recommendation to DOD Component Head, who will then determine and document decision. 
From Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 152. 
  
                                                 
244 Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 151. 
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APPENDIX F. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT DATA 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the Secretary of Defense, 
submits “a SAR to Congress for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).”245 
SARs provide current estimates of cost, schedule, and performance.246  
PMs submit SARs according to the quoted stipulations below: 
 The current estimate exceeds the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) 
objective or the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) objective of the 
currently approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) in base-year 
dollars by 15 percent or more  
 The current estimate exceeds the PAUC or APUC objective of the original 
APB in base-year dollars by 30 percent or more 
 The current estimate includes a 6-month, or greater, delay for any 
schedule parameter that occurred since the current estimate reported in the 
previous SAR  
 Milestone B or Milestone C approval occurs within the reportable 
quarter247 
Table 9 demonstrates the quantity and type of breaches over the past five years. 
Table 9.   Historical 5-Year Overall View of SARs Submitted 
Year Number of 
Programs 
Nunn-McCurdy Unit 
Cost Breaches  
Annual Overall Performance 
2010 95 
programs 
3 programs with 
critical breaches  
4 programs with 
significant breaches 
21 other Significant 
Program Cost Changes 
“For the December 2010 reporting 
period, there is a net cost increase of 
$63,982.3 million, or +4.0 percent for 
the 95 programs covered relative to the 
same programs in previous SARs.”248 
2011 83 3 programs with “For the December 2011 reporting 
                                                 
245 Defense Acquisition University, “Chapter 10-Decisions, Assessments, and Periodic Reporting,” 
44. 
246 Ibid., 45. 
247 Ibid., 45. 
248 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2010, 2. 
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programs critical breaches  
0 programs with 
significant breaches 
18 other significant 
program cost changes 
 
period, there is a net cost decrease of 
$8,727.1 million or -0.5 percent for the 
83 programs covered relative to the 
same programs in previous SARs. This 
cost decrease is due primarily to a net 
decrease in planned quantities to be 
purchased  (-$16,171.6 
million) along with associated support 
requirements (-$7,065.6 million).  
There are also net decreases in program 
cost estimates (-$9,132.4 million) and 
engineering changes to 
hardware/software (-$3,717.5 million). 
These decreases were partially offset 
by the application of higher escalation 
rates (+$17,651.4 million) and a net 
stretch-out of development and 




2 programs with 
critical breaches  
0 programs with 
Significant Breaches 
19 other significant 
program cost changes 
“For the December 2012 reporting 
period, there is a net cost increase of 
$39,617.7 million or +2.44 percent for 
the 78 programs that have reported 
previously in SARs. This cost increase 
is due primarily to the application of 
higher escalation rates (+$21,816.4 
million), a net increase in planned 
quantities to be purchased (+$21,615.6 
million), and a net stretch-out of 
development and procurement 
schedules (+$436.3 million). These 
increases were partially offset by net 
decreases in program cost estimates  
(-$2,561.4 million), engineering 
changes to hardware/ software (-$29.9 
million) and reductions in associated 




2 programs with 
critical breaches  
2 programs with 
“For the December 2013 reporting 
period, there is a net cost decrease of 
$4,379.7 million or -0.3 percent for the 
                                                 
249 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2011, 2. 
250 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2012, 2. 
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significant breaches 
15 other significant 
program cost changes 
77 programs that have reported in 
previous SARs. This cost decrease is 
due primarily to a net reduction in 
planned quantities to be purchased (-
$14,885.5 million), the application of 
lower escalation rates (-$3,631.8 
million), and reductions in associated 
support requirements (-$2,522.6 
million). These decreases were 
partially offset by a net stretch-out of 
development and procurement 
schedules (+$6,814.8 million), a net 
increase in program cost estimates 
(+$5,464.2 million), and engineering 




1 programs with 
critical breaches  
1 programs with 
significant breaches 
15 other significant 
program cost changes 
“For the December 2014 reporting 
period, there is a net cost decrease of 
$9,118.9 million or -0.6 percent for the 
79 programs that have reported in 
previous SARs. This cost decrease is 
due primarily to the application of 
lower escalation rates (-$10,795.2 
million) and reductions in support 
requirements (-$9,000.5 million). 
These decreases were partially offset 
by a net increase in the cost of planned 
purchase quantities (+$2,487.2), a net 
stretch-out of development and 
procurement schedules (+$2,383.7 
million), engineering changes to 
hardware/software (+$5,432.9 million), 
a net increase in program cost estimates 
(+$158.5 million), and an increase in 
other costs due to prior year impacts to 
the LPD 17 San Antonio Class 
Amphibious Transport Dock (+214.5 
million).”252 
After “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, 
2010–2014, accessed June 12, 2015.  
                                                 
251 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2013, 2. 
252 “Selected Acquisition Report Summary Tables,” USD AT&L, last modified December 31, 2014, 2. 
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